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Likee-Live, Chat & Party Games

Likeme Pte. Ltd. · Build 5.65.1

video.like
Static analysis completeScanned 2026-09-29 15:31 UTC

Static checks identify review items, not a guarantee of safety.

Overview

Analysis recorded

6 finding categories to review

Likee-Live, Chat & Party Games (video.like) scored grade B, 78 out of 100, in a static scan of version 5.65.1 on 2026-09-29. It has no high or critical findings, and 6 lower-severity finding categories across 11 occurrences. 17 tracking SDKs are present in the package, which describes what ships, not what runs or what it sends. This is static analysis of a single build: it does not observe the app running and does not establish that any data is exposed.

Finding categories611 occurrences
High / critical0Category count
Tracking SDKs17Presence, not observed traffic
Assessment score78 / 100Grade B

Start with these findings

mediumCleartext (HTTP) traffic permitted1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The manifest permits cleartext (HTTP) traffic. Data sent over plain HTTP can be read or tampered with on the network; modern apps should require HTTPS.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
mediumcom.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp 3.12.13 — CVE-2021-03411 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app bundles a third-party library whose declared version matches a public security advisory (CVE). This is flagged from the version the library itself ships and a curated advisory list — confirm exploitability in your context and update the dependency to the fixed version. It is not a proof of live exploitation.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
mediumExported content provider without permission5 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

An exported content provider declares no permission. Other apps on the device may reach it — verify it enforces access control internally; this flags the attack surface, not a confirmed leak.

Evidence
5 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
View all 6 categories

Privacy

71 requested permissions · 8 flagged high-risk classes.

Review privacy signals →

Build & components

2 components recorded. Certificate parsing does not validate APK signature integrity.

Inspect build evidence →

Findings

6 categories · 11 occurrences. Severity totals describe categories. Expand a finding for interpretation and review guidance.

mediumCleartext (HTTP) traffic permitted1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The manifest permits cleartext (HTTP) traffic. Data sent over plain HTTP can be read or tampered with on the network; modern apps should require HTTPS.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Parsed app configuration
Representative location
AndroidManifest.xml
Recorded match
android:usesCleartextTraffic="true"
Detector rule
manifest
Recorded file locations
  • AndroidManifest.xml

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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mediumcom.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp 3.12.13 — CVE-2021-03411 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app bundles a third-party library whose declared version matches a public security advisory (CVE). This is flagged from the version the library itself ships and a curated advisory list — confirm exploitability in your context and update the dependency to the fixed version. It is not a proof of live exploitation.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Component advisory match
Representative location
sbom:com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp:CVE-2021-0341
Recorded match
CVE-2021-0341 (fixed in 4.9.2)
Detector rule
sbom
Recorded file locations
  • sbom:com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp:CVE-2021-0341

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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mediumExported content provider without permission5 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

An exported content provider declares no permission. Other apps on the device may reach it — verify it enforces access control internally; this flags the attack surface, not a confirmed leak.

Evidence
5 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Parsed app configuration
Representative location
AndroidManifest.xml:com.yy.iheima.ThirdPartAwakeComponent
Recorded match
ThirdPartAwakeComponent (exported, no permission)
Detector rule
manifest
Recorded file locations
  • AndroidManifest.xml:com.yy.iheima.ThirdPartAwakeComponent

5 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowFirebase Realtime Database reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Realtime Database URL. Nearly every app that uses Firebase ships one. It's only an exposure if the database rules are world-readable — that's what live verification checks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
firebase_db
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowFirebase Storage bucket reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Cloud Storage bucket reference (the default <project>.appspot.com). Storing user files here is normal — it's only an exposure if the Storage security rules allow public read/list, which live verification tests.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
firebase_storage_bucket
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)2 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
AIza•••••••• (21–40 chars, redacted)
Detector rule
google_api_key
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

2 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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Privacy signals

Capabilities and bundled software do not prove that data was collected or transmitted.

Requested permissions71
Flagged high-risk classes8
Detected SDKs17

Approx. location Camera Microphone Contacts Call log Phone state Storage Draw over other apps

Requested permission inventory (71)
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_AD_ID
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_ATTRIBUTION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_TOPICS
  • android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN
  • android.permission.CALL_PHONE
  • android.permission.CAMERA
  • android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.FLASHLIGHT
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_CAMERA
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PLAYBACK
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PROJECTION
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MICROPHONE
  • android.permission.GET_PACKAGE_SIZE
  • android.permission.GET_TASKS
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS
  • android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS
  • android.permission.READ_APP_BADGE
  • android.permission.READ_CALL_LOG
  • android.permission.READ_CONTACTS
  • android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_AUDIO
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_IMAGES
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_VIDEO
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_VISUAL_USER_SELECTED
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_NUMBERS
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.READ_SYNC_SETTINGS
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
  • android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO
  • android.permission.REORDER_TASKS
  • android.permission.SCHEDULE_EXACT_ALARM
  • android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
  • android.permission.USE_FINGERPRINT
  • android.permission.USE_FULL_SCREEN_INTENT
  • android.permission.VIBRATE
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • android.permission.WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS
  • com.android.vending.BILLING
  • com.applovin.array.apphub.permission.BIND_APPHUB_SERVICE
  • com.coloros.mcs.permission.RECIEVE_MCS_MESSAGE
  • com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE
  • com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID
  • com.google.android.providers.gsf.permission.READ_GSERVICES
  • com.heytap.mcs.permission.RECIEVE_MCS_MESSAGE
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.CHANGE_BADGE
  • com.huawei.appmarket.service.commondata.permission.GET_COMMON_DATA
  • com.imo.android.imoim.lockscreen.provider.read
  • com.imo.android.imoim.permission.Bepulled
  • com.imo.android.imoimbeta.lockscreen.provider.read
  • com.samsung.android.mapsagent.permission.READ_APP_INFO
  • com.sonyericsson.home.permission.BROADCAST_BADGE
  • com.truecaller.permission.sdk.internal.read_account_state
  • com.vivo.notification.permission.BADGE_ICON
  • sg.bigo.live.permission.Bepulled
  • video.like.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION
  • video.like.permission.MIPUSH_RECEIVE
  • video.like.permission.PERMISSION_SAFE_BROADCAST
  • video.like.permission.PERMISSION_TITAN_SAFE_BROADCAST
  • video.like.permission.PROCESS_PUSH_MSG
  • video.like.permission.PUSH_PROVIDER
  • video.like.wallpaper.plugin.permission

Data collection & flow (privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Data the app can access
Call log
Call log
Camera
Camera
Contacts
Contacts
Location
Approximate location
Microphone
Microphone
Phone
Phone state / numberPhone number
Photos & files
Storage (write)Audio filesPhotosVideosStorage
Persistent identifiers (referenced in code)
Advertising ID (AAID)Android IDDevice ID / IMEISubscriber ID (IMSI)Hardware MAC address
Where it can go
Third parties present (15)
AppLovinGoogle AdMobMeta Audience NetworkMintegralMopubUnity AdsVungleYandex AdsironSourceGoogle Analytics for FirebaseGoogle Firebase AnalyticsGoogle Tag ManagerMeta / Facebook SDKYandex MetricaAppsFlyer
  • Approximate location requested while 10 ad/attribution SDK(s) are present (AppLovin, Google AdMob, Meta Audience Network +7 more) — location commonly feeds ad targeting.
  • Persistent-identifier APIs referenced in code (Advertising ID (AAID), Android ID, Device ID / IMEI +2 more) with 15 analytics/ad SDK(s) present — the mechanism used for cross-app profiling.
  • Call log, Camera, Contacts, Microphone, Phone, Photos & files data requested with third-party analytics/ad SDKs present.

This maps what the app can access (permissions it requests, identifier APIs its code references) to the third parties bundled in it. It reflects capability and SDK presence — not proof that a specific value was transmitted.

Data Safety: declared vs observed (Play label vs our analysis)

Declared collected
App activityApp info and performanceContactsDevice or other IDsFinancial infoLocationPersonal infoPhotos and videos
Declared shared
Photos and videos
We observe the app can access
ContactsLocation
✓ No obvious mismatch between the declaration and what we observe.

We compare the developer's Google Play Data Safety declaration with what the binary can actually do (permissions it requests, identifier APIs and third-party SDKs it ships). A mismatch is a capability signal to confirm — a requested permission is not proof of collection.

Trackers & SDKs (17 detected · privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Advertising
AppLovinGoogle AdMobMeta Audience NetworkMintegralMopubUnity AdsVungleYandex AdsironSource
Analytics
Google Analytics for FirebaseGoogle Firebase AnalyticsGoogle Tag ManagerMeta / Facebook SDKYandex Metrica
Attribution
AppsFlyer
Consent
Google UMP (consent)IAB TCF

Build & components

Scanned build 5.65.1. Store metadata may describe a newer release.

APK SHA-256d0ffa1b006e9307d1185d352411051597d67bcfefa03ee4a6e0cd613d9639420

Signing certificate (who signed this build — factual, not part of the grade)

Signer
bigo self-signed
Scheme
V3V2V1
Key
RSA 2048-bit
Algorithm
sha256WithRSA
Validity
2014-10-28 → 2042-03-15
Cert SHA-256
5c:33:31:05:42:3f:4d:1b:07:4a:8d:eb:7e:5a:2c:6e:9b:48:5c:f4:7f:d6:fd:53:09:77:8e:8d:c3:62:94:01

The certificate fingerprint identifies the parsed signing certificate. Knowing this public fingerprint does not establish ownership or validate the APK signature.

Signature integrity: not established by certificate parsing.

Component inventory

2 components. Advisory matching covers a curated set; no match is not proof that a component is vulnerability-free.

Bundled components and recorded advisory matches
ComponentVersionAdvisory matches
androidx.datastore:datastore1.0.0None recorded
com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp3.12.13
1 match

CVE-2021-0341 · medium
Improper hostname verification in certain configurations could allow certificate spoofing / pinning bypass.
Fixed version: 4.9.2

Export SBOM
About this app · store information

About this app

Live streaming, voice chat rooms, Party Games, Ludo, Domino, Uno & live battles

Content ratingTeen
Download size155.2 MB
Privacy policyPublished →
Developer sitelikee.video/

Screenshots

App screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshot

Scan history

Each row is an observed scan. Gaps between scans do not establish how long a finding existed.

Scanned (UTC)BuildScoreGrade
2026-09-29 15:31 UTC5.65.178B
2026-09-21 11:56 UTC5.64.278B
2026-09-11 20:24 UTC5.64.178B
2026-09-04 19:49 UTC5.63.279B

View changes between the last two scans →

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Coverage & gap matrix · Verify signed evidence

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apk-scanner.com exposure grade
Markdown
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HTML
<a href="https://apk-scanner.com/app/video.like"><img src="https://apk-scanner.com/app/video.like/badge.svg" alt="apk-scanner.com exposure grade" height="20"></a>

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