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Kuku FM: Audio Series

Kuku Technologies Limited · Build 6.1.2

com.vlv.aravali
Static analysis completeScanned 2026-10-09 03:54 UTC

Static checks identify review items, not a guarantee of safety.

Overview

Analysis recorded

6 finding categories to review

Kuku FM: Audio Series (com.vlv.aravali) scored grade B, 88 out of 100, in a static scan of version 6.1.2 on 2026-10-09. It has no high or critical findings, and 6 lower-severity finding categories across 12 occurrences. 9 tracking SDKs are present in the package, which describes what ships, not what runs or what it sends. This is static analysis of a single build: it does not observe the app running and does not establish that any data is exposed.

Finding categories612 occurrences
High / critical0Category count
Tracking SDKs9Presence, not observed traffic
Assessment score88 / 100Grade B

Start with these findings

mediumExported content provider without permission2 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

An exported content provider declares no permission. Other apps on the device may reach it — verify it enforces access control internally; this flags the attack surface, not a confirmed leak.

Evidence
2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowAmazon S3 bucket reference6 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

A reference to an Amazon S3 bucket. Using cloud storage is normal — the risk exists only if the bucket allows anonymous listing/read, which requires a separate authorized assessment.

Evidence
6 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowBackground location access with advertising SDKs present1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app can access location in the background (even when closed) and also ships advertising/attribution SDKs. Background location is a heightened-scrutiny area for Google Play and privacy regulators; confirm it is essential and disclosed, and that location isn't shared with ad networks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
View all 6 categories

Privacy

39 requested permissions · 6 flagged high-risk classes.

Review privacy signals →

Build & components

12 components recorded. Certificate parsing does not validate APK signature integrity.

Inspect build evidence →

Findings

6 categories · 12 occurrences. Severity totals describe categories. Expand a finding for interpretation and review guidance.

mediumExported content provider without permission2 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

An exported content provider declares no permission. Other apps on the device may reach it — verify it enforces access control internally; this flags the attack surface, not a confirmed leak.

Evidence
2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Parsed app configuration
Representative location
AndroidManifest.xml:vlv.aravali.utils.sharedLogin.SharedDataProvider
Recorded match
SharedDataProvider (exported, no permission)
Detector rule
manifest
Recorded file locations
  • AndroidManifest.xml:vlv.aravali.utils.sharedLogin.SharedDataProvider

2 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowAmazon S3 bucket reference6 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

A reference to an Amazon S3 bucket. Using cloud storage is normal — the risk exists only if the bucket allows anonymous listing/read, which requires a separate authorized assessment.

Evidence
6 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
classes5.dex
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
s3_bucket_url
Recorded file locations
  • classes5.dex

6 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowBackground location access with advertising SDKs present1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app can access location in the background (even when closed) and also ships advertising/attribution SDKs. Background location is a heightened-scrutiny area for Google Play and privacy regulators; confirm it is essential and disclosed, and that location isn't shared with ad networks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static privacy indicators
Representative location
pii:bgloc
Recorded match
background location + ad SDKs
Detector rule
pii
Recorded file locations
  • pii:bgloc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowFirebase Realtime Database reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Realtime Database URL. Nearly every app that uses Firebase ships one. It's only an exposure if the database rules are world-readable — that's what live verification checks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
firebase_db
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

lowFirebase Storage bucket reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Cloud Storage bucket reference (the default <project>.appspot.com). Storing user files here is normal — it's only an exposure if the Storage security rules allow public read/list, which live verification tests.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
firebase_storage_bucket
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
AIza•••••••• (21–40 chars, redacted)
Detector rule
google_api_key
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

Privacy signals

Capabilities and bundled software do not prove that data was collected or transmitted.

Requested permissions39
Flagged high-risk classes6
Detected SDKs9

Background location Precise location Approx. location Camera Microphone Phone state

Requested permission inventory (39)
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_AD_ID
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_ATTRIBUTION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_CUSTOM_AUDIENCE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_TOPICS
  • android.permission.ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECT
  • android.permission.CAMERA
  • android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PLAYBACK
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS
  • android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS
  • android.permission.READ_BASIC_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
  • android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO
  • android.permission.SCHEDULE_EXACT_ALARM
  • android.permission.USE_BIOMETRIC
  • android.permission.USE_FINGERPRINT
  • android.permission.VIBRATE
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • com.android.vending.BILLING
  • com.android.vending.CHECK_LICENSE
  • com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE
  • com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID
  • com.google.android.providers.gsf.permission.READ_GSERVICES
  • com.huawei.appmarket.service.commondata.permission.GET_COMMON_DATA
  • com.samsung.android.mapsagent.permission.READ_APP_INFO
  • com.truecaller.permission.sdk.internal.read_account_state
  • com.vlv.aravali.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION

Data collection & flow (privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Data the app can access
Camera
Camera
Location
Precise locationBackground locationApproximate location
Microphone
Microphone
Phone
Phone state / number
Photos & files
StorageStorage (write)
Persistent identifiers (referenced in code)
Advertising ID (AAID)Android IDDevice ID / IMEI
Where it can go
Third parties present (7)
Google AdMobGoogle Analytics for FirebaseGoogle Firebase AnalyticsGoogle Tag ManagerMeta / Facebook SDKSegmentAppsFlyer
  • Precise location, Background location, Approximate location requested while 2 ad/attribution SDK(s) are present (Google AdMob, AppsFlyer) — location commonly feeds ad targeting.
  • Persistent-identifier APIs referenced in code (Advertising ID (AAID), Android ID, Device ID / IMEI) with 7 analytics/ad SDK(s) present — the mechanism used for cross-app profiling.
  • Camera, Microphone, Phone, Photos & files data requested with third-party analytics/ad SDKs present.

This maps what the app can access (permissions it requests, identifier APIs its code references) to the third parties bundled in it. It reflects capability and SDK presence — not proof that a specific value was transmitted.

Data Safety comparison not recorded.

Trackers & SDKs (9 detected · privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Advertising
Google AdMob
Analytics
Google Analytics for FirebaseGoogle Firebase AnalyticsGoogle Tag ManagerMeta / Facebook SDKSegment
Attribution
AppsFlyer
Consent
IAB TCF
Crash reporting
Google Crashlytics

Build & components

Scanned build 6.1.2. Store metadata may describe a newer release.

APK SHA-256d6ed18f572bb07ac9c98b137a922ffae388c03b53e78c4961b3f99b4fe72c79b

Signing certificate (who signed this build — factual, not part of the grade)

Signer
Tuktuk self-signed
Scheme
V3V2
Key
RSA 2048-bit
Algorithm
sha256WithRSA
Validity
2018-06-02 → 2043-05-27
Cert SHA-256
c1:65:1d:6f:bf:a2:9a:6f:56:8f:5e:9d:49:0a:28:51:81:9f:10:03:06:fd:04:ea:4f:48:c1:4a:65:36:8b:26

The certificate fingerprint identifies the parsed signing certificate. Knowing this public fingerprint does not establish ownership or validate the APK signature.

Signature integrity: not established by certificate parsing.

Component inventory

12 components. Advisory matching covers a curated set; no match is not proof that a component is vulnerability-free.

Bundled components and recorded advisory matches
ComponentVersionAdvisory matches
com.google.dagger:dagger2.59.2None recorded
com.google.dagger:dagger-lint-aar2.59.2None recorded
com.google.dagger:hilt-android2.59.2None recorded
com.google.dagger:hilt-core2.59.2None recorded
com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp5.3.2None recorded
kotlinx:coroutines_android1.10.2None recorded
kotlinx:coroutines_core1.10.2None recorded
kotlinx:coroutines_guava1.10.2None recorded
kotlinx:coroutines_play_services1.10.2None recorded
kotlinx:coroutines_reactive1.10.2None recorded
kotlinx:coroutines_rx21.10.2None recorded
org.jetbrains.compose.ui:ui-backhandler1.9.1None recorded
Export SBOM
About this app · store information

About this app

Audio shows for every mood - Listen anytime, anywhere

Content ratingEveryone
Download size44.0 MB
Privacy policyPublished →
Developer sitekukufm.com/

Screenshots

App screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshot

Scan history

Each row is an observed scan. Gaps between scans do not establish how long a finding existed.

Scanned (UTC)BuildScoreGrade
2026-10-09 03:54 UTC6.1.288B
2026-10-02 03:16 UTC6.1.288B
2026-09-25 03:09 UTC5.9.988B

View changes between the last two scans →

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