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ScanSnap Home：Scan・PDF・OCR

PFU Limited. · Build 4.1.0

com.ricoh.pfu.scansnaphome
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Static analysis completeScanned 2026-10-12 09:35 UTC

Static checks identify review items, not a guarantee of safety.

Overview

Review needed

1 high or critical finding category to review

ScanSnap Home：Scan・PDF・OCR (com.ricoh.pfu.scansnaphome) scored grade C, 74 out of 100, in a static scan of version 4.1.0 on 2026-10-12. It has 1 high or critical finding among 5 finding categories across 7 occurrences. 6 tracking SDKs are present in the package, which describes what ships, not what runs or what it sends. This is static analysis of a single build: it does not observe the app running and does not establish that any data is exposed.

Finding categories57 occurrences
High / critical1Category count
Tracking SDKs6Presence, not observed traffic
Assessment score74 / 100Grade C

Start with these findings

highGoogle OAuth client secret1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Google OAuth client secret. Shipping this in a mobile client is a misconfiguration — it can allow impersonation of the app's OAuth flow.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
Open in all findingsRequest a correction
mediumCleartext (HTTP) traffic permitted1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The manifest permits cleartext (HTTP) traffic. Data sent over plain HTTP can be read or tampered with on the network; modern apps should require HTTPS.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
Open in all findingsRequest a correction
lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)2 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
Open in all findingsRequest a correction
View all 5 categories

Privacy

31 requested permissions · 5 flagged high-risk classes.

Review privacy signals →

Build & components

99 components recorded. Certificate parsing does not validate APK signature integrity.

Inspect build evidence →
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Findings

5 categories · 7 occurrences. Severity totals describe categories. Expand a finding for interpretation and review guidance.

highGoogle OAuth client secret1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Google OAuth client secret. Shipping this in a mobile client is a misconfiguration — it can allow impersonation of the app's OAuth flow.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
res/raw/google_drive_auth_credentials_web.json
Recorded match
•••••••• (21–40 chars, redacted)
Detector rule
google_oauth_secret
Recorded file locations
  • res/raw/google_drive_auth_credentials_web.json

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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Link to categoryRequest a correction
mediumCleartext (HTTP) traffic permitted1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The manifest permits cleartext (HTTP) traffic. Data sent over plain HTTP can be read or tampered with on the network; modern apps should require HTTPS.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Parsed app configuration
Representative location
AndroidManifest.xml
Recorded match
android:usesCleartextTraffic="true"
Detector rule
manifest
Recorded file locations
  • AndroidManifest.xml

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

Link to categoryRequest a correction
lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)2 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
AIza•••••••• (21–40 chars, redacted)
Detector rule
google_api_key
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

2 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

Link to categoryRequest a correction
lowPrivate key material (third-party library artifact, shared across 185 unrelated developers)2 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

A complete PEM private-key block is embedded in the app. This is a real finding worth review — but it is often a bundled library test/sample key rather than a production secret, so we flag it high and leave confirmation to you (a bare header alone no longer triggers it).

Evidence
2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
classes2.dex
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
private_key
Recorded file locations
  • classes2.dex

2 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

Link to categoryRequest a correction
infoApplication data is backup-enabled1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app allows Android backups (android:allowBackup="true"). App data can then be extracted via adb backup on many devices — a concern if the app stores tokens or personal/health/payment data locally. Common and low-severity, but worth disabling for sensitive apps.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Parsed app configuration
Representative location
AndroidManifest.xml
Recorded match
android:allowBackup="true"
Detector rule
manifest
Recorded file locations
  • AndroidManifest.xml

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

Link to categoryRequest a correction

Privacy signals

Capabilities and bundled software do not prove that data was collected or transmitted.

Requested permissions31
Flagged high-risk classes5
Detected SDKs6

Precise location Approx. location Camera Phone state Storage

Requested permission inventory (31)
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_AD_ID
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_ATTRIBUTION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADVERTISE
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECT
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH_SCAN
  • android.permission.CALL_PHONE
  • android.permission.CAMERA
  • android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE
  • android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.NEARBY_WIFI_DEVICES
  • android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS
  • android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
  • android.permission.VIBRATE
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • com.android.vending.BILLING
  • com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE
  • com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID
  • com.ricoh.pfu.scansnaphome.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION

Data collection & flow (privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Data the app can access
Camera
Camera
Location
Approximate locationPrecise location
Phone
Phone state / number
Photos & files
Storage (write)Storage
Persistent identifiers (referenced in code)
Advertising ID (AAID)Android IDDevice ID / IMEIHardware MAC address
Where it can go
Third parties present (5)
Google AdMobDatadog RUMGoogle Analytics for FirebaseGoogle Firebase AnalyticsGoogle Tag Manager
  • Approximate location, Precise location requested while 1 ad/attribution SDK(s) are present (Google AdMob) — location commonly feeds ad targeting.
  • Persistent-identifier APIs referenced in code (Advertising ID (AAID), Android ID, Device ID / IMEI +1 more) with 5 analytics/ad SDK(s) present — the mechanism used for cross-app profiling.
  • Camera, Phone, Photos & files data requested with third-party analytics/ad SDKs present.

This maps what the app can access (permissions it requests, identifier APIs its code references) to the third parties bundled in it. It reflects capability and SDK presence — not proof that a specific value was transmitted.

Data Safety comparison not recorded.

Trackers & SDKs (6 detected · privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Advertising
Google AdMob
Analytics
Datadog RUMGoogle Analytics for FirebaseGoogle Firebase AnalyticsGoogle Tag Manager
Consent
IAB TCF

Build & components

Scanned build 4.1.0. Store metadata may describe a newer release.

APK SHA-256bf028fa714bebbd40fea0dfc924177ddcc08ac3386931853baf12e376e81788a

Signing certificate (who signed this build — factual, not part of the grade)

Signer
Google Inc. self-signed
Scheme
V3V2
Key
RSA 4096-bit
Algorithm
sha256WithRSA
Validity
2023-06-01 → 2053-06-01
Cert SHA-256
83:bd:aa:78:19:c9:ee:d6:5d:f4:ed:8e:d8:2f:0a:9b:f9:a7:d2:76:23:0f:95:a7:24:48:e8:a7:e7:41:8b:70

The certificate fingerprint identifies the parsed signing certificate. Knowing this public fingerprint does not establish ownership or validate the APK signature.

Signature integrity: not established by certificate parsing.

Component inventory

99 components. Advisory matching covers a curated set; no match is not proof that a component is vulnerability-free.

Bundled components and recorded advisory matches
ComponentVersionAdvisory matches
androidx.activity:activity1.9.3None recorded
androidx.activity:activity-compose1.9.3None recorded
androidx.activity:activity-ktx1.9.3None recorded
androidx.annotation:annotation-experimental1.4.1None recorded
androidx.appcompat:appcompat1.7.0None recorded
androidx.appcompat:appcompat-resources1.7.0None recorded
androidx.asynclayoutinflater:asynclayoutinflater1.0.0None recorded
androidx.autofill:autofill1.0.0None recorded
androidx.browser:browser1.8.0None recorded
androidx.cardview:cardview1.0.0None recorded
androidx.compose.animation:animation1.7.2None recorded
androidx.compose.animation:animation-core1.7.2None recorded
androidx.compose.foundation:foundation1.7.2None recorded
androidx.compose.foundation:foundation-layout1.7.2None recorded
androidx.compose.material3.adaptive:adaptive1.0.0None recorded
androidx.compose.material3:material31.3.0None recorded
androidx.compose.material:material1.7.0None recorded
androidx.compose.material:material-icons-core1.7.0None recorded
androidx.compose.material:material-ripple1.7.0None recorded
androidx.compose.runtime:runtime1.7.2None recorded
androidx.compose.runtime:runtime-saveable1.7.2None recorded
androidx.compose.ui:ui1.7.2None recorded
androidx.compose.ui:ui-geometry1.7.2None recorded
androidx.compose.ui:ui-graphics1.7.2None recorded
androidx.compose.ui:ui-text1.7.2None recorded
androidx.compose.ui:ui-text-google-fonts1.7.2None recorded
androidx.compose.ui:ui-tooling-preview1.7.2None recorded
androidx.compose.ui:ui-unit1.7.2None recorded
androidx.compose.ui:ui-util1.7.2None recorded
androidx.constraintlayout:constraintlayout-compose1.1.0None recorded
androidx.coordinatorlayout:coordinatorlayout1.1.0None recorded
androidx.core:core1.13.1None recorded
androidx.core:core-ktx1.13.1None recorded
androidx.cursoradapter:cursoradapter1.0.0None recorded
androidx.customview:customview1.1.0None recorded
androidx.customview:customview-poolingcontainer1.0.0None recorded
androidx.databinding:viewbinding8.6.0None recorded
androidx.datastore:datastore1.1.7None recorded
androidx.datastore:datastore-core1.1.7None recorded
androidx.datastore:datastore-preferences1.1.7None recorded
androidx.datastore:datastore-preferences-core1.1.7None recorded
androidx.documentfile:documentfile1.0.1None recorded
androidx.drawerlayout:drawerlayout1.1.1None recorded
androidx.dynamicanimation:dynamicanimation1.0.0None recorded
androidx.emoji2:emoji21.3.0None recorded
androidx.emoji2:emoji2-views-helper1.3.0None recorded
androidx.exifinterface:exifinterface1.3.6None recorded
androidx.fragment:fragment1.6.1None recorded
androidx.fragment:fragment-ktx1.6.1None recorded
androidx.graphics:graphics-path1.0.1None recorded
androidx.interpolator:interpolator1.0.0None recorded
androidx.legacy:legacy-support-core-ui1.0.0None recorded
androidx.legacy:legacy-support-core-utils1.0.0None recorded
androidx.legacy:legacy-support-v131.0.0None recorded
androidx.legacy:legacy-support-v41.0.0None recorded
androidx.lifecycle:lifecycle-livedata2.8.3None recorded
androidx.lifecycle:lifecycle-livedata-core2.8.3None recorded
androidx.lifecycle:lifecycle-livedata-core-ktx2.8.3None recorded
androidx.lifecycle:lifecycle-process2.8.3None recorded
androidx.lifecycle:lifecycle-runtime2.8.3None recorded
androidx.lifecycle:lifecycle-runtime-compose2.8.3None recorded
androidx.lifecycle:lifecycle-runtime-ktx2.8.3None recorded
androidx.lifecycle:lifecycle-service2.8.3None recorded
androidx.lifecycle:lifecycle-viewmodel2.8.3None recorded
androidx.lifecycle:lifecycle-viewmodel-compose2.8.3None recorded
androidx.lifecycle:lifecycle-viewmodel-ktx2.8.3None recorded
androidx.lifecycle:lifecycle-viewmodel-savedstate2.8.3None recorded
androidx.loader:loader1.0.0None recorded
androidx.localbroadcastmanager:localbroadcastmanager1.0.0None recorded
androidx.media:media1.0.0None recorded
androidx.print:print1.0.0None recorded
androidx.privacysandbox.ads:ads-adservices1.1.0-beta11None recorded
androidx.privacysandbox.ads:ads-adservices-java1.1.0-beta11None recorded
androidx.profileinstaller:profileinstaller1.3.1None recorded
androidx.recyclerview:recyclerview1.2.1None recorded
androidx.room:room-runtime2.5.0None recorded
androidx.savedstate:savedstate1.2.1None recorded
androidx.savedstate:savedstate-ktx1.2.1None recorded
androidx.slidingpanelayout:slidingpanelayout1.0.0None recorded
androidx.sqlite:sqlite2.3.0None recorded
androidx.sqlite:sqlite-framework2.3.0None recorded
androidx.startup:startup-runtime1.1.1None recorded
androidx.swiperefreshlayout:swiperefreshlayout1.1.0None recorded
androidx.tracing:tracing1.0.0None recorded
androidx.transition:transition1.5.0None recorded
androidx.vectordrawable:vectordrawable1.1.0None recorded
androidx.vectordrawable:vectordrawable-animated1.1.0None recorded
androidx.versionedparcelable:versionedparcelable1.1.1None recorded
androidx.viewpager2:viewpager21.0.0None recorded
androidx.viewpager:viewpager1.0.0None recorded
androidx.window.extensions.core:core1.0.0None recorded
androidx.window:window1.3.0None recorded
androidx.window:window-core1.3.0None recorded
androidx.work:work-runtime2.8.1None recorded
com.google.android.material:material1.12.0None recorded
com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp4.12.0None recorded
kotlinx:coroutines_android1.9.0None recorded
kotlinx:coroutines_core1.9.0None recorded
kotlinx:coroutines_play_services1.9.0None recorded
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About this app

Your documents can be managed with ScanSnap Home easily

Content ratingEveryone
Download size226.6 MB
Privacy policyPublished →

Screenshots

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Scan history

Each row is an observed scan. Gaps between scans do not establish how long a finding existed.

Scanned (UTC)BuildScoreGrade
2026-10-12 09:35 UTC4.1.074C
2026-10-05 09:34 UTC4.1.074C
2026-09-28 09:33 UTC4.0.372C

View changes between the last two scans →

Export & share

Exports describe the recorded assessment. Signed evidence proves origin and integrity, not completeness or safety.

SARIFFindings CSVCoverage JSONSigned evidenceSBOM

Coverage & gap matrix · Verify signed evidence

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The badge reads the latest recorded grade each time it is loaded, and links back to the full report so a reader can see the build it covers and what the scan could not see.

apk-scanner.com exposure grade
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