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KwaiCut - Video Editor

Kwai Technology Limited · Build 7.47.0.747162

com.kwai.editor
Static analysis completeScanned 2026-10-09 11:42 UTC

Static checks identify review items, not a guarantee of safety.

Overview

Analysis recorded

3 finding categories to review

KwaiCut - Video Editor (com.kwai.editor) scored grade B, 86 out of 100, in a static scan of version 7.47.0.747162 on 2026-10-09. It has no high or critical findings, and 3 lower-severity finding categories across 4 occurrences. 14 tracking SDKs are present in the package, which describes what ships, not what runs or what it sends. This is static analysis of a single build: it does not observe the app running and does not establish that any data is exposed.

Finding categories34 occurrences
High / critical0Category count
Tracking SDKs14Presence, not observed traffic
Assessment score86 / 100Grade B

Start with these findings

mediumcom.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp 3.12.13 — CVE-2021-03411 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app bundles a third-party library whose declared version matches a public security advisory (CVE). This is flagged from the version the library itself ships and a curated advisory list — confirm exploitability in your context and update the dependency to the fixed version. It is not a proof of live exploitation.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
mediumExported content provider without permission2 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

An exported content provider declares no permission. Other apps on the device may reach it — verify it enforces access control internally; this flags the attack surface, not a confirmed leak.

Evidence
2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
View all 3 categories

Privacy

66 requested permissions · 3 flagged high-risk classes.

Review privacy signals →

Build & components

1 components recorded. Certificate parsing does not validate APK signature integrity.

Inspect build evidence →

Findings

3 categories · 4 occurrences. Severity totals describe categories. Expand a finding for interpretation and review guidance.

mediumcom.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp 3.12.13 — CVE-2021-03411 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app bundles a third-party library whose declared version matches a public security advisory (CVE). This is flagged from the version the library itself ships and a curated advisory list — confirm exploitability in your context and update the dependency to the fixed version. It is not a proof of live exploitation.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Component advisory match
Representative location
sbom:com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp:CVE-2021-0341
Recorded match
CVE-2021-0341 (fixed in 4.9.2)
Detector rule
sbom
Recorded file locations
  • sbom:com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp:CVE-2021-0341

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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mediumExported content provider without permission2 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

An exported content provider declares no permission. Other apps on the device may reach it — verify it enforces access control internally; this flags the attack surface, not a confirmed leak.

Evidence
2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Parsed app configuration
Representative location
AndroidManifest.xml:nce.component.manager.provider.UniversalProvider
Recorded match
UniversalProvider (exported, no permission)
Detector rule
manifest
Recorded file locations
  • AndroidManifest.xml:nce.component.manager.provider.UniversalProvider

2 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
AIza•••••••• (21–40 chars, redacted)
Detector rule
google_api_key
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

Privacy signals

Capabilities and bundled software do not prove that data was collected or transmitted.

Requested permissions66
Flagged high-risk classes3
Detected SDKs14

Camera Microphone Draw over other apps

Requested permission inventory (66)
  • MediaStore.Images.Media.EXTERNAL_CONTENT_URI
  • MediaStore.Images.Media.INTERNAL_CONTENT_URI
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_AD_ID
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_ATTRIBUTION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_CUSTOM_AUDIENCE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_TOPICS
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECT
  • android.permission.CAMERA
  • android.permission.CAPTURE_VIDEO_OUTPUT
  • android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.DEVICE_POWER
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PROJECTION
  • android.permission.GET_TASKS
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS
  • android.permission.MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS
  • android.permission.NFC
  • android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS
  • android.permission.RAISED_THREAD_PRIORITY
  • android.permission.READ_APP_BADGE
  • android.permission.READ_LOGS
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_AUDIO
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_IMAGES
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_VIDEO
  • android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO
  • android.permission.RECORD_VIDEO
  • android.permission.REORDER_TASKS
  • android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
  • android.permission.USE_BIOMETRIC
  • android.permission.USE_FINGERPRINT
  • android.permission.VIBRATE
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • android.permission.WRITE_CALENDAR
  • com.anddoes.launcher.permission.UPDATE_COUNT
  • com.android.vending.BILLING
  • com.android.vending.CHECK_LICENSE
  • com.applovin.array.apphub.permission.BIND_APPHUB_SERVICE
  • com.asus.msa.SupplementaryDID.ACCESS
  • com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE
  • com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.UPDATE_SHORTCUT
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.CHANGE_BADGE
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS
  • com.huawei.appmarket.service.commondata.permission.GET_COMMON_DATA
  • com.kwai.editor.KWAI_LINK_PERMISSION_BROADCAST
  • com.kwai.editor.PERMISSION_UPDATE_SDK_CONFIG
  • com.kwai.editor.openadsdk.permission.TT_PANGOLIN
  • com.kwai.editor.permission.KUIKLY_NOTIFY
  • com.kwai.editor.refreshToken.ALLOW_RECEIVED
  • com.majeur.launcher.permission.UPDATE_BADGE
  • com.oppo.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.oppo.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.READ
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.WRITE
  • com.sonyericsson.home.permission.BROADCAST_BADGE
  • com.sonymobile.home.permission.PROVIDER_INSERT_BADGE
  • freemme.permission.msa
  • me.everything.badger.permission.BADGE_COUNT_READ
  • me.everything.badger.permission.BADGE_COUNT_WRITE

Data collection & flow (privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Data the app can access
Calendar
Calendar (write)
Camera
Camera
Microphone
Microphone
Photos & files
StorageStorage (write)PhotosVideosAudio files
Persistent identifiers (referenced in code)
Advertising ID (AAID)Android IDDevice ID / IMEISubscriber ID (IMSI)SIM serialHardware MAC address
Where it can go
Third parties present (11)
AppLovinGoogle AdMobInMobiMeta Audience NetworkMintegralPangle (ByteDance)Google Analytics for FirebaseGoogle Firebase AnalyticsGoogle Tag ManagerMeta / Facebook SDKAppsFlyer
  • Persistent-identifier APIs referenced in code (Advertising ID (AAID), Android ID, Device ID / IMEI +3 more) with 11 analytics/ad SDK(s) present — the mechanism used for cross-app profiling.
  • Calendar, Camera, Microphone, Photos & files data requested with third-party analytics/ad SDKs present.

This maps what the app can access (permissions it requests, identifier APIs its code references) to the third parties bundled in it. It reflects capability and SDK presence — not proof that a specific value was transmitted.

Data Safety comparison not recorded.

Trackers & SDKs (14 detected · privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Advertising
AppLovinGoogle AdMobInMobiMeta Audience NetworkMintegralPangle (ByteDance)
Analytics
Google Analytics for FirebaseGoogle Firebase AnalyticsGoogle Tag ManagerMeta / Facebook SDK
Attribution
AppsFlyer
Consent
Google UMP (consent)IAB TCF
Crash reporting
Google Crashlytics

Build & components

Scanned build 7.47.0.747162. Store metadata may describe a newer release.

APK SHA-256dab94f3e193a03a62f531260e5fedc97f5036876b98610d114b439a37caf92c6

Signing certificate (who signed this build — factual, not part of the grade)

Signer
SparkShine self-signed
Scheme
V3V2V1
Key
RSA 2048-bit
Algorithm
sha256WithRSA
Validity
2023-05-23 → 2048-05-16
Cert SHA-256
46:24:ca:ce:24:a7:2b:df:e5:74:98:c2:ea:c2:63:96:2f:b8:40:76:7f:bb:87:5b:d9:97:d0:e8:06:af:29:22

The certificate fingerprint identifies the parsed signing certificate. Knowing this public fingerprint does not establish ownership or validate the APK signature.

Signature integrity: not established by certificate parsing.

Component inventory

1 components. Advisory matching covers a curated set; no match is not proof that a component is vulnerability-free.

Bundled components and recorded advisory matches
ComponentVersionAdvisory matches
com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp3.12.13
1 match

CVE-2021-0341 · medium
Improper hostname verification in certain configurations could allow certificate spoofing / pinning bypass.
Fixed version: 4.9.2

Export SBOM
About this app · store information

About this app

Kwai Official Video Editing Tool

Content ratingEveryone
Download size196.4 MB
Privacy policyPublished →

Screenshots

App screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshot

Scan history

Each row is an observed scan. Gaps between scans do not establish how long a finding existed.

Scanned (UTC)BuildScoreGrade
2026-10-09 11:42 UTC7.47.0.74716286B
2026-10-02 10:39 UTC7.47.0.74716186B
2026-09-12 02:23 UTC7.47.0.74716086B
2026-09-09 22:55 UTC7.47.0.747160Not gradedNot graded

View changes between the last two scans →

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Coverage & gap matrix · Verify signed evidence

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apk-scanner.com exposure grade
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