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Instagram · Build 451.0.0.51.80

com.instagram.barcelona
Static analysis completeScanned 2026-10-13 00:40 UTC

Static checks identify review items, not a guarantee of safety.

Overview

Analysis recorded

2 finding categories to review

Threads (com.instagram.barcelona) scored grade A, 98 out of 100, in a static scan of version 451.0.0.51.80 on 2026-10-13. It has no high or critical findings, and 2 lower-severity finding categories across 3 occurrences. 4 tracking SDKs are present in the package, which describes what ships, not what runs or what it sends. This is static analysis of a single build: it does not observe the app running and does not establish that any data is exposed.

Finding categories23 occurrences
High / critical0Category count
Tracking SDKs4Presence, not observed traffic
Assessment score98 / 100Grade A

Start with these findings

lowFirebase Realtime Database reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Realtime Database URL. Nearly every app that uses Firebase ships one. It's only an exposure if the database rules are world-readable — that's what live verification checks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)2 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
View all 2 categories

Privacy

43 requested permissions · 8 flagged high-risk classes.

Review privacy signals →

Build & components

2 components recorded. Certificate parsing does not validate APK signature integrity.

Inspect build evidence →

Findings

2 categories · 3 occurrences. Severity totals describe categories. Expand a finding for interpretation and review guidance.

lowFirebase Realtime Database reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Realtime Database URL. Nearly every app that uses Firebase ships one. It's only an exposure if the database rules are world-readable — that's what live verification checks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
firebase_db
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)2 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
AIza•••••••• (21–40 chars, redacted)
Detector rule
google_api_key
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

2 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

Privacy signals

Capabilities and bundled software do not prove that data was collected or transmitted.

Requested permissions43
Flagged high-risk classes8
Detected SDKs4

Precise location Approx. location Camera Microphone Contacts Phone state Accounts Draw over other apps

Requested permission inventory (43)
  • .permission.RECEIVE_ADM_MESSAGE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_MEDIA_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH
  • android.permission.CALL_PHONE
  • android.permission.CAMERA
  • android.permission.CAPTURE_VIDEO_OUTPUT
  • android.permission.CREDENTIAL_MANAGER_SET_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS
  • android.permission.DETECT_SCREEN_CAPTURE
  • android.permission.DETECT_SCREEN_RECORDING
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PROJECTION
  • android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.MEDIA_PROJECTION
  • android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS
  • android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS
  • android.permission.READ_CONTACTS
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_IMAGES
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_VIDEO
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_VISUAL_USER_SELECTED
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.READ_PROFILE
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
  • android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO
  • android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
  • android.permission.USE_BIOMETRIC
  • android.permission.USE_CREDENTIALS
  • android.permission.USE_FINGERPRINT
  • android.permission.VIBRATE
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • com.amazon.device.messaging.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.android.vending.BILLING
  • com.facebook.katana.provider.ACCESS
  • com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE
  • com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID
  • com.instagram.barcelona.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION
  • com.instagram.barcelona.permission.CROSS_PROCESS_BROADCAST_MANAGER

Data collection & flow (privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Data the app can access
Camera
Camera
Contacts
Contacts
Location
Precise locationApproximate location
Microphone
Microphone
Personal info
Device accounts
Phone
Phone state / number
Photos & files
StoragePhotosVideosStorage (write)
Persistent identifiers (referenced in code)
Advertising ID (AAID)Android IDDevice ID / IMEISubscriber ID (IMSI)SIM serial
Where it can go
Third parties present (4)
Google AdMobMeta Audience NetworkGoogle AnalyticsNew Relic
  • Precise location, Approximate location requested while 2 ad/attribution SDK(s) are present (Google AdMob, Meta Audience Network) — location commonly feeds ad targeting.
  • Persistent-identifier APIs referenced in code (Advertising ID (AAID), Android ID, Device ID / IMEI +2 more) with 4 analytics/ad SDK(s) present — the mechanism used for cross-app profiling.
  • Camera, Contacts, Microphone, Personal info, Phone, Photos & files data requested with third-party analytics/ad SDKs present.

This maps what the app can access (permissions it requests, identifier APIs its code references) to the third parties bundled in it. It reflects capability and SDK presence — not proof that a specific value was transmitted.

Data Safety: declared vs observed (Play label vs our analysis)

Declared collected
App activityApp info and performanceCalendarContactsDevice or other IDsFiles and docsFinancial infoHealth and fitnessLocationMessagesPersonal infoPhotos and videosWeb browsing
Declared shared
Device or other IDsPersonal info
We observe the app can access
ContactsLocation
✓ No obvious mismatch between the declaration and what we observe.

We compare the developer's Google Play Data Safety declaration with what the binary can actually do (permissions it requests, identifier APIs and third-party SDKs it ships). A mismatch is a capability signal to confirm — a requested permission is not proof of collection.

Trackers & SDKs (4 detected · privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Advertising
Google AdMobMeta Audience Network
Analytics
Google AnalyticsNew Relic

Build & components

Scanned build 451.0.0.51.80. Store metadata may describe a newer release.

APK SHA-25671565b3011351b8ee58d6b643fec3c6d2e09425a2bf4a2b2b2717dacaee33028

Signing certificate (who signed this build — factual, not part of the grade)

Signer
Meta Platforms Inc. self-signed
Scheme
V3V2
Key
RSA 4096-bit
Algorithm
sha256WithRSA
Validity
2023-01-26 → 2053-01-25
Cert SHA-256
53:67:57:0b:ad:48:8d:8d:a6:a0:fa:b7:8d:97:66:a1:a4:c2:3c:3c:70:fa:c0:ad:2e:91:c8:f0:bd:58:b4:32

The certificate fingerprint identifies the parsed signing certificate. Knowing this public fingerprint does not establish ownership or validate the APK signature.

Signature integrity: not established by certificate parsing.

Component inventory

2 components. Advisory matching covers a curated set; no match is not proof that a component is vulnerability-free.

Bundled components and recorded advisory matches
ComponentVersionAdvisory matches
androidx.compose.ui:ui1.10.6None recorded
com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp4.10.0None recorded
Export SBOM
About this app · store information

About this app

Connect and share ideas

Content ratingTeen
Download size133.6 MB
Privacy policyPublished →
Developer sitehelp.instagram.com/

Screenshots

App screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshot

Scan history

Each row is an observed scan. Gaps between scans do not establish how long a finding existed.

Scanned (UTC)BuildScoreGrade
2026-10-13 00:40 UTC451.0.0.51.8098A
2026-10-06 00:31 UTC450.0.0.51.7898A
2026-09-29 00:29 UTC448.0.0.54.8592A
2026-09-21 21:35 UTC447.0.0.54.8186B
2026-09-14 08:07 UTC446.0.0.32.7886B
2026-09-06 21:41 UTC445.0.0.46.8386B

View changes between the last two scans →

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Exports describe the recorded assessment. Signed evidence proves origin and integrity, not completeness or safety.

Coverage & gap matrix · Verify signed evidence

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apk-scanner.com exposure grade
Markdown
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HTML
<a href="https://apk-scanner.com/app/com.instagram.barcelona"><img src="https://apk-scanner.com/app/com.instagram.barcelona/badge.svg" alt="apk-scanner.com exposure grade" height="20"></a>

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