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Lloyds Mobile Banking

Lloyds Banking Group PLC · Build 194.05

com.grppl.android.shell.CMBlloydsTSB73
Static analysis completeScanned 2026-10-08 18:39 UTC

Static checks identify review items, not a guarantee of safety.

Overview

Analysis recorded

3 finding categories to review

Lloyds Mobile Banking (com.grppl.android.shell.CMBlloydsTSB73) scored grade A, 97 out of 100, in a static scan of version 194.05 on 2026-10-08. It has no high or critical findings, and 3 lower-severity finding categories across 4 occurrences. 4 tracking SDKs are present in the package, which describes what ships, not what runs or what it sends. This is static analysis of a single build: it does not observe the app running and does not establish that any data is exposed.

Finding categories34 occurrences
High / critical0Category count
Tracking SDKs4Presence, not observed traffic
Assessment score97 / 100Grade A

Start with these findings

lowFirebase Realtime Database reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Realtime Database URL. Nearly every app that uses Firebase ships one. It's only an exposure if the database rules are world-readable — that's what live verification checks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowFirebase Storage bucket reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Cloud Storage bucket reference (the default <project>.appspot.com). Storing user files here is normal — it's only an exposure if the Storage security rules allow public read/list, which live verification tests.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)2 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
View all 3 categories

Privacy

47 requested permissions · 7 flagged high-risk classes.

Review privacy signals →

Build & components

0 components recorded. Certificate parsing does not validate APK signature integrity.

Inspect build evidence →

Findings

3 categories · 4 occurrences. Severity totals describe categories. Expand a finding for interpretation and review guidance.

lowFirebase Realtime Database reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Realtime Database URL. Nearly every app that uses Firebase ships one. It's only an exposure if the database rules are world-readable — that's what live verification checks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
firebase_db
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowFirebase Storage bucket reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Cloud Storage bucket reference (the default <project>.appspot.com). Storing user files here is normal — it's only an exposure if the Storage security rules allow public read/list, which live verification tests.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
firebase_storage_bucket
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)2 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
AIza•••••••• (21–40 chars, redacted)
Detector rule
google_api_key
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

2 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

Privacy signals

Capabilities and bundled software do not prove that data was collected or transmitted.

Requested permissions47
Flagged high-risk classes7
Detected SDKs4

Precise location Approx. location Camera Microphone Phone state Storage List installed apps

Requested permission inventory (47)
  • android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.CALL_PHONE
  • android.permission.CAMERA
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE
  • android.permission.HIGH_SAMPLING_RATE_SENSORS
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.NFC
  • android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS
  • android.permission.QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES
  • android.permission.READ_APP_BADGE
  • android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
  • android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO
  • android.permission.REORDER_TASKS
  • android.permission.USE_BIOMETRIC
  • android.permission.USE_FINGERPRINT
  • android.permission.VIBRATE
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • com.anddoes.launcher.permission.UPDATE_COUNT
  • com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE
  • com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID
  • com.grppl.android.shell.CMBlloydsTSB73.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION
  • com.grppl.android.shell.CMBlloydsTSB73.com.liveperson.permission.COBROWSE_ACTIONS
  • com.grppl.android.shell.CMBlloydsTSB73.com.liveperson.permission.HYBRID_SDK_ACTIONS
  • com.grppl.android.shell.CMBlloydsTSB73.com.liveperson.permission.WELCOME_MESSAGE_ACTIONS
  • com.halifax.cprovider.READ_DATA
  • com.halifax.cprovider.WRITE_DATA
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.UPDATE_SHORTCUT
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.CHANGE_BADGE
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS
  • com.majeur.launcher.permission.UPDATE_BADGE
  • com.mobile.lloyds.retail.permission.DEEP_LINK
  • com.oppo.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.oppo.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.READ
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.WRITE
  • com.sonyericsson.home.permission.BROADCAST_BADGE
  • com.sonymobile.home.permission.PROVIDER_INSERT_BADGE
  • me.everything.badger.permission.BADGE_COUNT_READ
  • me.everything.badger.permission.BADGE_COUNT_WRITE

Data collection & flow (privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Data the app can access
Camera
Camera
Location
Precise locationApproximate location
Microphone
Microphone
Phone
Phone state / number
Photos & files
Storage (write)Storage
Persistent identifiers (referenced in code)
Advertising ID (AAID)Android IDDevice ID / IMEISubscriber ID (IMSI)Hardware MAC address
Where it can go
Third parties present (4)
Google AdMobGoogle AnalyticsGoogle Firebase AnalyticsGoogle Tag Manager
  • Precise location, Approximate location requested while 1 ad/attribution SDK(s) are present (Google AdMob) — location commonly feeds ad targeting.
  • Persistent-identifier APIs referenced in code (Advertising ID (AAID), Android ID, Device ID / IMEI +2 more) with 4 analytics/ad SDK(s) present — the mechanism used for cross-app profiling.
  • Camera, Microphone, Phone, Photos & files data requested with third-party analytics/ad SDKs present.

This maps what the app can access (permissions it requests, identifier APIs its code references) to the third parties bundled in it. It reflects capability and SDK presence — not proof that a specific value was transmitted.

Data Safety comparison not recorded.

Trackers & SDKs (4 detected · privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Advertising
Google AdMob
Analytics
Google AnalyticsGoogle Firebase AnalyticsGoogle Tag Manager

Build & components

Scanned build 194.05. Store metadata may describe a newer release.

APK SHA-2561767f452ddddc791d472170beea2c22154b9904aaf44a9459d9d6b0bda2dbc7f

Signing certificate (who signed this build — factual, not part of the grade)

Signer
grapplemobile.com self-signed
Scheme
V3V2
Key
DSA
Algorithm
dsaWithSha1
Validity
2010-04-12 → 2039-12-31
Cert SHA-256
cd:5a:3e:3f:58:f2:08:58:96:b7:23:12:16:6d:d6:e3:3a:42:7b:af:fa:5e:a7:3c:7b:a5:13:c9:fe:1b:91:e2

The certificate fingerprint identifies the parsed signing certificate. Knowing this public fingerprint does not establish ownership or validate the APK signature.

Signature integrity: not established by certificate parsing.

Component inventory

No bundled components detected by this scan.

Export SBOM
About this app · store information

About this app

Your bank in your pocket

Content ratingEveryone
Download size315.0 MB
Privacy policyPublished →

Screenshots

App screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshot

Scan history

Each row is an observed scan. Gaps between scans do not establish how long a finding existed.

Scanned (UTC)BuildScoreGrade
2026-10-08 18:39 UTC194.0597A
2026-10-01 18:32 UTC194.0597A
2026-09-07 03:19 UTC192.0591A

View changes between the last two scans →

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Coverage & gap matrix · Verify signed evidence

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apk-scanner.com exposure grade
Markdown
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