Browse appsScan report

Google Meet

Google LLC · Build 379.0.989469524.duo.android_20260928.02_p0

com.google.android.apps.tachyon
Static analysis completeScanned 2026-10-09 04:12 UTC

Static checks identify review items, not a guarantee of safety.

Overview

Analysis recorded

3 finding categories to review

Google Meet (com.google.android.apps.tachyon) scored grade A, 92 out of 100, in a static scan of version 379.0.989469524.duo.android_20260928.02_p0 on 2026-10-09. It has no high or critical findings, and 3 lower-severity finding categories across 10 occurrences. 1 tracking SDK is present in the package, which describes what ships, not what runs or what it sends. This is static analysis of a single build: it does not observe the app running and does not establish that any data is exposed.

Finding categories310 occurrences
High / critical0Category count
Tracking SDKs1Presence, not observed traffic
Assessment score92 / 100Grade A

Start with these findings

mediumExported content provider without permission1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

An exported content provider declares no permission. Other apps on the device may reach it — verify it enforces access control internally; this flags the attack surface, not a confirmed leak.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowFirebase Realtime Database reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Realtime Database URL. Nearly every app that uses Firebase ships one. It's only an exposure if the database rules are world-readable — that's what live verification checks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)8 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
8 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
View all 3 categories

Privacy

68 requested permissions · 6 flagged high-risk classes.

Review privacy signals →

Build & components

1 components recorded. Certificate parsing does not validate APK signature integrity.

Inspect build evidence →

Findings

3 categories · 10 occurrences. Severity totals describe categories. Expand a finding for interpretation and review guidance.

mediumExported content provider without permission1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

An exported content provider declares no permission. Other apps on the device may reach it — verify it enforces access control internally; this flags the attack surface, not a confirmed leak.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Parsed app configuration
Representative location
AndroidManifest.xml:.external.googleguide.GoogleGuideContentProvider
Recorded match
GoogleGuideContentProvider (exported, no permission)
Detector rule
manifest
Recorded file locations
  • AndroidManifest.xml:.external.googleguide.GoogleGuideContentProvider

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowFirebase Realtime Database reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Realtime Database URL. Nearly every app that uses Firebase ships one. It's only an exposure if the database rules are world-readable — that's what live verification checks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
firebase_db
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)8 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
8 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
classes5.dex
Recorded match
AIza•••••••• (21–40 chars, redacted)
Detector rule
google_api_key
Recorded file locations
  • classes5.dex

8 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

Privacy signals

Capabilities and bundled software do not prove that data was collected or transmitted.

Requested permissions68
Flagged high-risk classes6
Detected SDKs1

Camera Microphone Contacts Phone state Accounts Draw over other apps

Requested permission inventory (68)
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NOTIFICATION_POLICY
  • android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECT
  • android.permission.BROADCAST_STICKY
  • android.permission.CALL_PHONE
  • android.permission.CAMERA
  • android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_CAMERA
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PLAYBACK
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PROJECTION
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MICROPHONE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_PHONE_CALL
  • android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS
  • android.permission.GET_PACKAGE_SIZE
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.MANAGE_ACCOUNTS
  • android.permission.MANAGE_OWN_CALLS
  • android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS
  • android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS
  • android.permission.READ_APP_BADGE
  • android.permission.READ_CONTACTS
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.READ_PROFILE
  • android.permission.READ_SYNC_STATS
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
  • android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO
  • android.permission.RUN_USER_INITIATED_JOBS
  • android.permission.STATUS_BAR
  • android.permission.STOP_APP_SWITCHES
  • android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
  • android.permission.USE_EXACT_ALARM
  • android.permission.USE_FULL_SCREEN_INTENT
  • android.permission.VIBRATE
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • android.permission.WRITE_CALL_LOG
  • android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS
  • android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • android.permission.WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS
  • com.anddoes.launcher.permission.UPDATE_COUNT
  • com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT
  • com.google.android.apps.tachyon.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION
  • com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.google.android.gm.permission.READ_HUB_FEATURE_STATUS
  • com.google.android.providers.gsf.permission.READ_GSERVICES
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.UPDATE_SHORTCUT
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.CHANGE_BADGE
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS
  • com.majeur.launcher.permission.UPDATE_BADGE
  • com.oppo.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.oppo.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS
  • com.samsung.android.app.telephonyui.permission.READ_SETTINGS_PROVIDER
  • com.samsung.android.app.telephonyui.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS_PROVIDER
  • com.samsung.android.aremoji.provider.permission.READ_STICKER_PROVIDER
  • com.samsung.android.livestickers.provider.permission.READ_STICKER_PROVIDER
  • com.samsung.android.mcfds.permission.AUTOSWITCH_EXTRA_CALL
  • com.samsung.android.provider.filterprovider.permission.READ_FILTER
  • com.samsung.android.provider.stickerprovider.permission.READ_STICKER_PROVIDER
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.READ
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.WRITE
  • com.sonyericsson.home.permission.BROADCAST_BADGE
  • com.sonymobile.home.permission.PROVIDER_INSERT_BADGE

Data collection & flow (privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Data the app can access
Call log
Call log (write)
Camera
Camera
Contacts
ContactsContacts (write)
Microphone
Microphone
Personal info
Device accounts
Phone
Phone state / number
Photos & files
Storage (write)
Persistent identifiers (referenced in code)
Android IDDevice ID / IMEI
Where it can go
Third parties present (1)
Google Analytics for Firebase
  • Persistent-identifier APIs referenced in code (Android ID, Device ID / IMEI) with 1 analytics/ad SDK(s) present — the mechanism used for cross-app profiling.
  • Call log, Camera, Contacts, Microphone, Personal info, Phone, Photos & files data requested with third-party analytics/ad SDKs present.

This maps what the app can access (permissions it requests, identifier APIs its code references) to the third parties bundled in it. It reflects capability and SDK presence — not proof that a specific value was transmitted.

Data Safety comparison not recorded.

Trackers & SDKs (1 detected · privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Analytics
Google Analytics for Firebase

Build & components

Scanned build 379.0.989469524.duo.android_20260928.02_p0. Store metadata may describe a newer release.

APK SHA-256c95edc15ab53b1271a98eb968e65ba8ca2cc17cf66cffc98e650f0fc83ef3045

Signing certificate (who signed this build — factual, not part of the grade)

Signer
Google Inc. self-signed
Scheme
V3V2
Key
RSA 2048-bit
Algorithm
sha1WithRSA
Validity
2015-01-23 → 2042-06-10
Cert SHA-256
7c:aa:b6:e6:ba:70:0e:0d:dc:f7:5c:ca:52:b8:c3:b1:9a:3c:7d:23:30:8f:7e:b1:77:a6:4e:b2:47:61:97:bd

The certificate fingerprint identifies the parsed signing certificate. Knowing this public fingerprint does not establish ownership or validate the APK signature.

Signature integrity: not established by certificate parsing.

Component inventory

1 components. Advisory matching covers a curated set; no match is not proof that a component is vulnerability-free.

Bundled components and recorded advisory matches
ComponentVersionAdvisory matches
com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp5.4.0None recorded
Export SBOM
About this app · store information

About this app

High quality video calling for Android & iOS phones, tablets, Google Nest & web.

Content ratingEveryone
Download size71.3 MB
Privacy policyPublished →

Screenshots

App screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshot

Scan history

Each row is an observed scan. Gaps between scans do not establish how long a finding existed.

Scanned (UTC)BuildScoreGrade
2026-10-09 04:12 UTC379.0.989469524.duo.android_20260928.02_p092A
2026-10-02 03:36 UTC378.0.985569815.duo.android_20260921.01_p192A
2026-09-25 03:34 UTC377.0.981860830.duo.android_20260914.01_p186B
2026-09-17 23:23 UTC375.0.975950222.duo.android_20260831.02_p385B
2026-09-08 00:24 UTC372.0.968082697.duo.android_20260810.02_p485B

View changes between the last two scans →

Export & share

Exports describe the recorded assessment. Signed evidence proves origin and integrity, not completeness or safety.

Coverage & gap matrix · Verify signed evidence

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apk-scanner.com exposure grade
Markdown
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HTML
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