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Google Messages

Google LLC · Build messages.android_20260928_02_RC00.phone_dynamic

com.google.android.apps.messaging
Static analysis completeScanned 2026-10-09 06:49 UTC

Static checks identify review items, not a guarantee of safety.

Overview

Review needed

1 high or critical finding category to review

Google Messages (com.google.android.apps.messaging) scored grade D, 48 out of 100, in a static scan of version messages.android_20260928_02_RC00.phone_dynamic on 2026-10-09. It has 1 high or critical finding among 8 finding categories across 29 occurrences. 2 tracking SDKs are present in the package, which describes what ships, not what runs or what it sends. This is static analysis of a single build: it does not observe the app running and does not establish that any data is exposed.

Finding categories829 occurrences
High / critical1Category count
Tracking SDKs2Presence, not observed traffic
Assessment score48 / 100Grade D

Start with these findings

highPrivate key material2 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

A complete PEM private-key block is embedded in the app. This is a real finding worth review — but it is often a bundled library test/sample key rather than a production secret, so we flag it high and leave confirmation to you (a bare header alone no longer triggers it).

Evidence
2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
mediumCleartext (HTTP) traffic permitted1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The manifest permits cleartext (HTTP) traffic. Data sent over plain HTTP can be read or tampered with on the network; modern apps should require HTTPS.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
mediumExported content provider without permission5 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

An exported content provider declares no permission. Other apps on the device may reach it — verify it enforces access control internally; this flags the attack surface, not a confirmed leak.

Evidence
5 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
View all 8 categories

Privacy

82 requested permissions · 8 flagged high-risk classes.

Review privacy signals →

Build & components

1 components recorded. Certificate parsing does not validate APK signature integrity.

Inspect build evidence →

Findings

8 categories · 29 occurrences. Severity totals describe categories. Expand a finding for interpretation and review guidance.

highPrivate key material2 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

A complete PEM private-key block is embedded in the app. This is a real finding worth review — but it is often a bundled library test/sample key rather than a production secret, so we flag it high and leave confirmation to you (a bare header alone no longer triggers it).

Evidence
2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
_split_config.arm64_v8a/lib/arm64-v8a/libgoogle3.so
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
private_key
Recorded file locations
  • _split_config.arm64_v8a/lib/arm64-v8a/libgoogle3.so

2 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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mediumCleartext (HTTP) traffic permitted1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The manifest permits cleartext (HTTP) traffic. Data sent over plain HTTP can be read or tampered with on the network; modern apps should require HTTPS.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Parsed app configuration
Representative location
AndroidManifest.xml
Recorded match
android:usesCleartextTraffic="true"
Detector rule
manifest
Recorded file locations
  • AndroidManifest.xml

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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mediumExported content provider without permission5 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

An exported content provider declares no permission. Other apps on the device may reach it — verify it enforces access control internally; this flags the attack surface, not a confirmed leak.

Evidence
5 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Parsed app configuration
Representative location
AndroidManifest.xml:.messaging.shared.datamodel.BugleContentProvider
Recorded match
BugleContentProvider (exported, no permission)
Detector rule
manifest
Recorded file locations
  • AndroidManifest.xml:.messaging.shared.datamodel.BugleContentProvider

5 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowFirebase Realtime Database reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Realtime Database URL. Nearly every app that uses Firebase ships one. It's only an exposure if the database rules are world-readable — that's what live verification checks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
firebase_db
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowFirebase Storage bucket reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Cloud Storage bucket reference (the default <project>.appspot.com). Storing user files here is normal — it's only an exposure if the Storage security rules allow public read/list, which live verification tests.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
firebase_storage_bucket
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)17 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
17 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
classes6.dex
Recorded match
AIza•••••••• (21–40 chars, redacted)
Detector rule
google_api_key
Recorded file locations
  • classes6.dex

17 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowGoogle Cloud Storage reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Google Cloud Storage reference. Normal for apps that use GCS; risky only if the bucket is publicly listable/readable (live-verified).

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
classes2.dex
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
gcs_bucket
Recorded file locations
  • classes2.dex

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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infoApplication data is backup-enabled1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app allows Android backups (android:allowBackup="true"). App data can then be extracted via adb backup on many devices — a concern if the app stores tokens or personal/health/payment data locally. Common and low-severity, but worth disabling for sensitive apps.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Parsed app configuration
Representative location
AndroidManifest.xml
Recorded match
android:allowBackup="true"
Detector rule
manifest
Recorded file locations
  • AndroidManifest.xml

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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Privacy signals

Capabilities and bundled software do not prove that data was collected or transmitted.

Requested permissions82
Flagged high-risk classes8
Detected SDKs2

Precise location Approx. location Camera Microphone Contacts Read SMS Send SMS Phone state

Requested permission inventory (82)
  • android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_MESSAGES_ON_ICC
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_RCS_USER_CAPABILITY_EXCHANGE
  • android.permission.CALL_PHONE
  • android.permission.CAMERA
  • android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.CONNECTIVITY_USE_RESTRICTED_NETWORKS
  • android.permission.DETECT_SCREEN_RECORDING
  • android.permission.DOWNLOAD_WITHOUT_NOTIFICATION
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PROCESSING
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_REMOTE_MESSAGING
  • android.permission.GET_PACKAGE_SIZE
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.MODIFY_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.PERFORM_IMS_SINGLE_REGISTRATION
  • android.permission.PERSONAL_CONTEXT_HOST_INSIGHT_SURFACE
  • android.permission.PERSONAL_CONTEXT_PUBLISH_HINTS
  • android.permission.PERSONAL_CONTEXT_READ_SETTINGS
  • android.permission.PERSONAL_CONTEXT_RECEIVE_INSIGHTS
  • android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS
  • android.permission.QUERY_ADVANCED_PROTECTION_MODE
  • android.permission.QUERY_USERS
  • android.permission.READ_APP_BADGE
  • android.permission.READ_CELL_BROADCASTS
  • android.permission.READ_CONTACTS
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_AUDIO
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_IMAGES
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_VIDEO
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_VISUAL_USER_SELECTED
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_NUMBERS
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.READ_PRECISE_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.READ_PRIVILEGED_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.READ_PROFILE
  • android.permission.READ_SMS
  • android.permission.READ_SYSTEM_GRAMMATICAL_GENDER
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_MMS
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH
  • android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO
  • android.permission.REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS
  • android.permission.SATELLITE_COMMUNICATION
  • android.permission.SCHEDULE_EXACT_ALARM
  • android.permission.SEND_SMS
  • android.permission.START_FOREGROUND_SERVICES_FROM_BACKGROUND
  • android.permission.VIBRATE
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS
  • android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • android.permission.WRITE_SMS
  • com.anddoes.launcher.permission.UPDATE_COUNT
  • com.android.vending.BILLING
  • com.cequint.ecid.CALLER_ID_EXTERNAL_LOOKUP_SMS
  • com.google.android.apps.aicore.service.BIND_SERVICE
  • com.google.android.apps.stargate.endpointservice.ACCESS_ENDPOINT_SERVICE
  • com.google.android.apps.stargate.permission.END_EMERGENCY_INTENTS
  • com.google.android.apps.stargate.permission.SEND_EMERGENCY_INTENTS
  • com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE
  • com.google.android.ims.LOG_ACCESS
  • com.google.android.ims.providers.ACCESS_DATA
  • com.google.android.providers.gsf.permission.READ_GSERVICES
  • com.google.android.setupwizard.READ_DEVICE_ORIGIN
  • com.google.android.setupwizard.READ_DEVICE_ORIGIN_FIRST_PARTY
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.UPDATE_SHORTCUT
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.CHANGE_BADGE
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS
  • com.majeur.launcher.permission.UPDATE_BADGE
  • com.oppo.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.oppo.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.READ
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.WRITE
  • com.sonyericsson.home.permission.BROADCAST_BADGE
  • com.sonymobile.home.permission.PROVIDER_INSERT_BADGE
  • com.sonymobile.launcher.permission.PROVIDER_INSERT_BADGE

Data collection & flow (privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Data the app can access
Camera
Camera
Contacts
ContactsContacts (write)
Location
Approximate locationPrecise location
Microphone
Microphone
Personal info
Device accounts
Phone
Privileged phone statePhone state / numberPhone number
Photos & files
Storage (write)StoragePhotosAudio filesVideos
SMS
Read SMSReceive SMSSend SMS
Persistent identifiers (referenced in code)
Android IDDevice ID / IMEISubscriber ID (IMSI)SIM serial
Where it can go
Third parties present (2)
Google Analytics for FirebaseNew Relic
  • Persistent-identifier APIs referenced in code (Android ID, Device ID / IMEI, Subscriber ID (IMSI) +1 more) with 2 analytics/ad SDK(s) present — the mechanism used for cross-app profiling.
  • Camera, Contacts, Microphone, Personal info, Phone, Photos & files, SMS data requested with third-party analytics/ad SDKs present.

This maps what the app can access (permissions it requests, identifier APIs its code references) to the third parties bundled in it. It reflects capability and SDK presence — not proof that a specific value was transmitted.

Data Safety: declared vs observed (Play label vs our analysis)

Declared collected
App activityApp info and performanceContactsDevice or other IDsFiles and docsLocationMessagesPersonal infoPhotos and videos
Declared shared
Device or other IDsLocationPersonal info
We observe the app can access
ContactsLocationMessages
✓ No obvious mismatch between the declaration and what we observe.

We compare the developer's Google Play Data Safety declaration with what the binary can actually do (permissions it requests, identifier APIs and third-party SDKs it ships). A mismatch is a capability signal to confirm — a requested permission is not proof of collection.

Trackers & SDKs (2 detected · privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Analytics
Google Analytics for FirebaseNew Relic

Build & components

Scanned build messages.android_20260928_02_RC00.phone_dynamic. Store metadata may describe a newer release.

APK SHA-256bddd50df2a5c6cef4b48bf4966a34bf5035e9347d2e2690102b8a3901d7959fd

Signing certificate (who signed this build — factual, not part of the grade)

Signer
Google Inc. self-signed
Scheme
V3V2
Key
RSA 2048-bit
Algorithm
sha1WithRSA
Validity
2014-06-17 → 2041-11-02
Cert SHA-256
cc:75:52:6d:6c:0f:80:ac:3b:3a:84:eb:44:83:84:40:db:be:6b:12:44:43:a7:c7:d7:bd:19:18:2a:c0:22:c9

The certificate fingerprint identifies the parsed signing certificate. Knowing this public fingerprint does not establish ownership or validate the APK signature.

Signature integrity: not established by certificate parsing.

Component inventory

1 components. Advisory matching covers a curated set; no match is not proof that a component is vulnerability-free.

Bundled components and recorded advisory matches
ComponentVersionAdvisory matches
com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp5.4.0None recorded
Export SBOM
About this app · store information

About this app

Simple, helpful messaging by Google

Content ratingEveryone
Download size143.0 MB
Privacy policyPublished →

Screenshots

App screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshot

Scan history

Each row is an observed scan. Gaps between scans do not establish how long a finding existed.

Scanned (UTC)BuildScoreGrade
2026-10-09 06:49 UTCmessages.android_20260928_02_RC00.phone_dynamic48D
2026-10-02 06:08 UTCmessages.android_20260917_03_RC00.phone_dynamic48D
2026-09-25 06:03 UTCmessages.android_20260910_03_RC02.phone_dynamic47D
2026-09-14 00:56 UTCmessages.android_20260827_01_RC02.phone_dynamic47D
2026-09-06 09:53 UTCmessages.android_20260820_02_RC05.phone_dynamic65C

View changes between the last two scans →

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Coverage & gap matrix · Verify signed evidence

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apk-scanner.com exposure grade
Markdown
[![apk-scanner.com exposure grade](https://apk-scanner.com/app/com.google.android.apps.messaging/badge.svg)](https://apk-scanner.com/app/com.google.android.apps.messaging)
HTML
<a href="https://apk-scanner.com/app/com.google.android.apps.messaging"><img src="https://apk-scanner.com/app/com.google.android.apps.messaging/badge.svg" alt="apk-scanner.com exposure grade" height="20"></a>

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