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Meta Business Suite

Meta Platforms, Inc. · Build 572.0.0.48.106

com.facebook.pages.app
Static analysis completeScanned 2026-09-30 02:59 UTC

Static checks identify review items, not a guarantee of safety.

Overview

Analysis recorded

3 finding categories to review

Meta Business Suite (com.facebook.pages.app) scored grade A, 92 out of 100, in a static scan of version 572.0.0.48.106 on 2026-09-30. It has no high or critical findings, and 3 lower-severity finding categories across 3 occurrences. 5 tracking SDKs are present in the package, which describes what ships, not what runs or what it sends. This is static analysis of a single build: it does not observe the app running and does not establish that any data is exposed.

Finding categories33 occurrences
High / critical0Category count
Tracking SDKs5Presence, not observed traffic
Assessment score92 / 100Grade A

Start with these findings

mediumShort signing key (RSA 1024-bit)1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The signing key is shorter than the modern 2048-bit RSA minimum. Short keys are cryptographically weaker; a release should re-key to at least RSA-2048 (or an EC key).

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowFirebase Realtime Database reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Realtime Database URL. Nearly every app that uses Firebase ships one. It's only an exposure if the database rules are world-readable — that's what live verification checks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
View all 3 categories

Privacy

61 requested permissions · 8 flagged high-risk classes.

Review privacy signals →

Build & components

2 components recorded. Certificate parsing does not validate APK signature integrity.

Inspect build evidence →

Findings

3 categories · 3 occurrences. Severity totals describe categories. Expand a finding for interpretation and review guidance.

mediumShort signing key (RSA 1024-bit)1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The signing key is shorter than the modern 2048-bit RSA minimum. Short keys are cryptographically weaker; a release should re-key to at least RSA-2048 (or an EC key).

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Signing metadata
Representative location
META-INF/signing:key
Recorded match
RSA-1024
Detector rule
signing
Recorded file locations
  • META-INF/signing:key

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowFirebase Realtime Database reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Realtime Database URL. Nearly every app that uses Firebase ships one. It's only an exposure if the database rules are world-readable — that's what live verification checks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
firebase_db
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
AIza•••••••• (21–40 chars, redacted)
Detector rule
google_api_key
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

Privacy signals

Capabilities and bundled software do not prove that data was collected or transmitted.

Requested permissions61
Flagged high-risk classes8
Detected SDKs5

Precise location Approx. location Camera Microphone Contacts Phone state Accounts Storage

Requested permission inventory (61)
  • android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_MEDIA_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH
  • android.permission.CALL_PHONE
  • android.permission.CAMERA
  • android.permission.CAPTURE_VIDEO_OUTPUT
  • android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.CREDENTIAL_MANAGER_SET_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS
  • android.permission.DETECT_SCREEN_CAPTURE
  • android.permission.DETECT_SCREEN_RECORDING
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_CAMERA
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PROJECTION
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MICROPHONE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_PHONE_CALL
  • android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.MANAGE_OWN_CALLS
  • android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS
  • android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS
  • android.permission.READ_CONTACTS
  • android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_IMAGES
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_VIDEO
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_VISUAL_USER_SELECTED
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
  • android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO
  • android.permission.RUN_USER_INITIATED_JOBS
  • android.permission.USE_BIOMETRIC
  • android.permission.USE_FINGERPRINT
  • android.permission.USE_FULL_SCREEN_INTENT
  • android.permission.VIBRATE
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • com.amazon.device.messaging.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT
  • com.facebook.katana.provider.ACCESS
  • com.facebook.pages.app.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION
  • com.facebook.pages.app.permission.CREATE_SHORTCUT
  • com.facebook.pages.app.permission.CROSS_PROCESS_BROADCAST_MANAGER
  • com.facebook.pages.app.permission.RECEIVE_ADM_MESSAGE
  • com.facebook.permission.prod.FB_APP_COMMUNICATION
  • com.facebook.receiver.permission.ACCESS
  • com.facebook.wakizashi.provider.ACCESS
  • com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE
  • com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.UPDATE_SHORTCUT
  • com.motorola.launcher3.permission.UNREAD_BADGE
  • com.nokia.pushnotifications.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.READ
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.WRITE
  • com.sonyericsson.home.permission.BROADCAST_BADGE
  • com.sonymobile.home.permission.PROVIDER_INSERT_BADGE

Data collection & flow (privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Data the app can access
Camera
Camera
Contacts
Contacts
Location
Precise locationApproximate location
Microphone
Microphone
Personal info
Device accounts
Phone
Phone state / number
Photos & files
VideosPhotosStorage (write)Storage
Persistent identifiers (referenced in code)
Advertising ID (AAID)Android IDDevice ID / IMEISubscriber ID (IMSI)SIM serial
Where it can go
Third parties present (5)
Google AdMobMeta Audience NetworkGoogle AnalyticsMeta / Facebook SDKNew Relic
  • Precise location, Approximate location requested while 2 ad/attribution SDK(s) are present (Google AdMob, Meta Audience Network) — location commonly feeds ad targeting.
  • Persistent-identifier APIs referenced in code (Advertising ID (AAID), Android ID, Device ID / IMEI +2 more) with 5 analytics/ad SDK(s) present — the mechanism used for cross-app profiling.
  • Camera, Contacts, Microphone, Personal info, Phone, Photos & files data requested with third-party analytics/ad SDKs present.

This maps what the app can access (permissions it requests, identifier APIs its code references) to the third parties bundled in it. It reflects capability and SDK presence — not proof that a specific value was transmitted.

Data Safety: declared vs observed (Play label vs our analysis)

Declared collected
App activityApp info and performanceCalendarContactsDevice or other IDsFiles and docsFinancial infoHealth and fitnessLocationMessagesPersonal infoPhotos and videosWeb browsing
Declared shared
Device or other IDsPersonal info
We observe the app can access
ContactsLocation
✓ No obvious mismatch between the declaration and what we observe.

We compare the developer's Google Play Data Safety declaration with what the binary can actually do (permissions it requests, identifier APIs and third-party SDKs it ships). A mismatch is a capability signal to confirm — a requested permission is not proof of collection.

Trackers & SDKs (5 detected · privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Advertising
Google AdMobMeta Audience Network
Analytics
Google AnalyticsMeta / Facebook SDKNew Relic

Build & components

Scanned build 572.0.0.48.106. Store metadata may describe a newer release.

APK SHA-2568a9e0bdd19267e798a6764838de2beb067e3116ced030286e204e8b5af934fad

Signing certificate (who signed this build — factual, not part of the grade)

Signer
Facebook Mobile self-signed
Scheme
V3V2
Key
RSA 1024-bit
Algorithm
md5WithRSA
Validity
2009-08-31 → 2050-09-25
Cert SHA-256
e3:f9:e1:e0:cf:99:d0:e5:6a:05:5b:a6:5e:24:1b:33:99:f7:ce:a5:24:32:6b:0c:dd:6e:c1:32:7e:d0:fd:c1

The certificate fingerprint identifies the parsed signing certificate. Knowing this public fingerprint does not establish ownership or validate the APK signature.

Signature integrity: not established by certificate parsing.

Component inventory

2 components. Advisory matching covers a curated set; no match is not proof that a component is vulnerability-free.

Bundled components and recorded advisory matches
ComponentVersionAdvisory matches
androidx.compose.ui:ui1.10.6None recorded
com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp4.10.0None recorded
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About this app · store information

About this app

Grow your business and connect with more people with Meta Business Suite.

Content ratingEveryone
Download size96.6 MB
Privacy policyPublished →

Screenshots

App screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshot

Scan history

Each row is an observed scan. Gaps between scans do not establish how long a finding existed.

Scanned (UTC)BuildScoreGrade
2026-09-30 02:59 UTC572.0.0.48.10692A
2026-09-14 12:58 UTC570.0.0.43.10586B
2026-09-07 08:13 UTC569.0.0.55.10586B

View changes between the last two scans →

Export & share

Exports describe the recorded assessment. Signed evidence proves origin and integrity, not completeness or safety.

Coverage & gap matrix · Verify signed evidence

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apk-scanner.com exposure grade
Markdown
[![apk-scanner.com exposure grade](https://apk-scanner.com/app/com.facebook.pages.app/badge.svg)](https://apk-scanner.com/app/com.facebook.pages.app)
HTML
<a href="https://apk-scanner.com/app/com.facebook.pages.app"><img src="https://apk-scanner.com/app/com.facebook.pages.app/badge.svg" alt="apk-scanner.com exposure grade" height="20"></a>

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API users can request authenticated, scan-specific exports at /v1/scans/df27dd39-a8f2-4a29-87fa-923213e1e867/findings.sarif (also coverage.json and proof.json).

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