Browse appsScan report

Messenger

Meta Platforms, Inc. · Build 580.0.0.49.91

com.facebook.orca
Static analysis completeScanned 2026-09-30 03:35 UTC

Static checks identify review items, not a guarantee of safety.

Overview

Analysis recorded

5 finding categories to review

Messenger (com.facebook.orca) scored grade B, 85 out of 100, in a static scan of version 580.0.0.49.91 on 2026-09-30. It has no high or critical findings, and 5 lower-severity finding categories across 7 occurrences. 4 tracking SDKs are present in the package, which describes what ships, not what runs or what it sends. This is static analysis of a single build: it does not observe the app running and does not establish that any data is exposed.

Finding categories57 occurrences
High / critical0Category count
Tracking SDKs4Presence, not observed traffic
Assessment score85 / 100Grade B

Start with these findings

mediumcom.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp 3.14.9 — CVE-2021-03411 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app bundles a third-party library whose declared version matches a public security advisory (CVE). This is flagged from the version the library itself ships and a curated advisory list — confirm exploitability in your context and update the dependency to the fixed version. It is not a proof of live exploitation.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
mediumShort signing key (RSA 1024-bit)1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The signing key is shorter than the modern 2048-bit RSA minimum. Short keys are cryptographically weaker; a release should re-key to at least RSA-2048 (or an EC key).

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowApplication data is backup-enabled1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app allows Android backups (android:allowBackup="true"). App data can then be extracted via adb backup on many devices — a concern if the app stores tokens or personal/health/payment data locally. Common and low-severity, but worth disabling for sensitive apps.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
View all 5 categories

Privacy

87 requested permissions · 10 flagged high-risk classes.

Review privacy signals →

Build & components

2 components recorded. Certificate parsing does not validate APK signature integrity.

Inspect build evidence →

Findings

5 categories · 7 occurrences. Severity totals describe categories. Expand a finding for interpretation and review guidance.

mediumcom.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp 3.14.9 — CVE-2021-03411 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app bundles a third-party library whose declared version matches a public security advisory (CVE). This is flagged from the version the library itself ships and a curated advisory list — confirm exploitability in your context and update the dependency to the fixed version. It is not a proof of live exploitation.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Component advisory match
Representative location
sbom:com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp:CVE-2021-0341
Recorded match
CVE-2021-0341 (fixed in 4.9.2)
Detector rule
sbom
Recorded file locations
  • sbom:com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp:CVE-2021-0341

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

mediumShort signing key (RSA 1024-bit)1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The signing key is shorter than the modern 2048-bit RSA minimum. Short keys are cryptographically weaker; a release should re-key to at least RSA-2048 (or an EC key).

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Signing metadata
Representative location
META-INF/signing:key
Recorded match
RSA-1024
Detector rule
signing
Recorded file locations
  • META-INF/signing:key

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

lowApplication data is backup-enabled1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app allows Android backups (android:allowBackup="true"). App data can then be extracted via adb backup on many devices — a concern if the app stores tokens or personal/health/payment data locally. Common and low-severity, but worth disabling for sensitive apps.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Parsed app configuration
Representative location
AndroidManifest.xml
Recorded match
android:allowBackup="true"
Detector rule
manifest
Recorded file locations
  • AndroidManifest.xml

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

lowFirebase Realtime Database reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Realtime Database URL. Nearly every app that uses Firebase ships one. It's only an exposure if the database rules are world-readable — that's what live verification checks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
firebase_db
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)3 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
3 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
classes11.dex
Recorded match
AIza•••••••• (21–40 chars, redacted)
Detector rule
google_api_key
Recorded file locations
  • classes11.dex

3 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

Privacy signals

Capabilities and bundled software do not prove that data was collected or transmitted.

Requested permissions87
Flagged high-risk classes10
Detected SDKs4

Precise location Approx. location Camera Microphone Contacts Phone state Calendar Accounts Storage Draw over other apps

Requested permission inventory (87)
  • android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECT
  • android.permission.CALL_PHONE
  • android.permission.CAMERA
  • android.permission.CAPTURE_VIDEO_OUTPUT
  • android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.CREDENTIAL_MANAGER_SET_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS
  • android.permission.DETECT_SCREEN_CAPTURE
  • android.permission.DETECT_SCREEN_RECORDING
  • android.permission.DOWNLOAD_WITHOUT_NOTIFICATION
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_CAMERA
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_CONNECTED_DEVICE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PROJECTION
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MICROPHONE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_PHONE_CALL
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_SPECIAL_USE
  • android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.MANAGE_ACCOUNTS
  • android.permission.MANAGE_OWN_CALLS
  • android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS
  • android.permission.NFC
  • android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS
  • android.permission.READ_BASIC_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.READ_CALENDAR
  • android.permission.READ_CONTACTS
  • android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_AUDIO
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_IMAGES
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_VIDEO
  • android.permission.READ_MEDIA_VISUAL_USER_SELECTED
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_NUMBERS
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.READ_PROFILE
  • android.permission.READ_SYNC_SETTINGS
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
  • android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO
  • android.permission.REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS
  • android.permission.SCHEDULE_EXACT_ALARM
  • android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
  • android.permission.USE_BIOMETRIC
  • android.permission.USE_FINGERPRINT
  • android.permission.USE_FULL_SCREEN_INTENT
  • android.permission.VIBRATE
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • android.permission.WRITE_CALENDAR
  • android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS
  • android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • android.permission.WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS
  • com.amazon.device.messaging.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT
  • com.android.vending.BILLING
  • com.facebook.katana.provider.ACCESS
  • com.facebook.messaging.appwidget.homescreenwidget.META_AI_APP_WIDGET
  • com.facebook.messaging.quicksnap.appwidget.QUICKSNAP_APP_WIDGET
  • com.facebook.mlite.provider.ACCESS
  • com.facebook.orca.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION
  • com.facebook.orca.permission.CREATE_SHORTCUT
  • com.facebook.orca.permission.CROSS_PROCESS_BROADCAST_MANAGER
  • com.facebook.orca.permission.RECEIVE_ADM_MESSAGE
  • com.facebook.orca.provider.ACCESS
  • com.facebook.permission.prod.FB_APP_COMMUNICATION
  • com.facebook.receiver.permission.ACCESS
  • com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE
  • com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID
  • com.google.android.providers.gsf.permission.READ_GSERVICES
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.UPDATE_SHORTCUT
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.CHANGE_BADGE
  • com.motorola.launcher3.permission.UNREAD_BADGE
  • com.nokia.pushnotifications.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.oculus.permission.REPORT_EVENTS
  • com.oculus.permission.REPORT_EVENTS_DEBUG
  • com.oculus.vrshell.BugReportBroadcastReceiverPermission
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.READ
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.WRITE
  • com.sonyericsson.home.permission.BROADCAST_BADGE
  • com.sonymobile.home.permission.PROVIDER_INSERT_BADGE

Data collection & flow (privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Data the app can access
Calendar
CalendarCalendar (write)
Camera
Camera
Contacts
ContactsContacts (write)
Location
Precise locationApproximate location
Microphone
Microphone
Personal info
Device accounts
Phone
Phone numberPhone state / number
Photos & files
Audio filesVideosPhotosStorage (write)Storage
Persistent identifiers (referenced in code)
Advertising ID (AAID)Android IDDevice ID / IMEISubscriber ID (IMSI)SIM serial
Where it can go
Third parties present (4)
Google AdMobMeta Audience NetworkGoogle AnalyticsNew Relic
  • Precise location, Approximate location requested while 2 ad/attribution SDK(s) are present (Google AdMob, Meta Audience Network) — location commonly feeds ad targeting.
  • Persistent-identifier APIs referenced in code (Advertising ID (AAID), Android ID, Device ID / IMEI +2 more) with 4 analytics/ad SDK(s) present — the mechanism used for cross-app profiling.
  • Calendar, Camera, Contacts, Microphone, Personal info, Phone, Photos & files data requested with third-party analytics/ad SDKs present.

This maps what the app can access (permissions it requests, identifier APIs its code references) to the third parties bundled in it. It reflects capability and SDK presence — not proof that a specific value was transmitted.

Data Safety: declared vs observed (Play label vs our analysis)

Declared collected
App activityApp info and performanceCalendarContactsDevice or other IDsFiles and docsFinancial infoHealth and fitnessLocationMessagesPersonal infoPhotos and videosWeb browsing
Declared shared
Device or other IDsPersonal info
We observe the app can access
CalendarContactsLocation
✓ No obvious mismatch between the declaration and what we observe.

We compare the developer's Google Play Data Safety declaration with what the binary can actually do (permissions it requests, identifier APIs and third-party SDKs it ships). A mismatch is a capability signal to confirm — a requested permission is not proof of collection.

Trackers & SDKs (4 detected · privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Advertising
Google AdMobMeta Audience Network
Analytics
Google AnalyticsNew Relic

Build & components

Scanned build 580.0.0.49.91. Store metadata may describe a newer release.

APK SHA-256d068360986a755208d5dceea57411e83225f1a288a821276d2293aa9eef81b7a

Signing certificate (who signed this build — factual, not part of the grade)

Signer
Facebook Mobile self-signed
Scheme
V3V2
Key
RSA 1024-bit
Algorithm
md5WithRSA
Validity
2009-08-31 → 2050-09-25
Cert SHA-256
e3:f9:e1:e0:cf:99:d0:e5:6a:05:5b:a6:5e:24:1b:33:99:f7:ce:a5:24:32:6b:0c:dd:6e:c1:32:7e:d0:fd:c1

The certificate fingerprint identifies the parsed signing certificate. Knowing this public fingerprint does not establish ownership or validate the APK signature.

Signature integrity: not established by certificate parsing.

Component inventory

2 components. Advisory matching covers a curated set; no match is not proof that a component is vulnerability-free.

Bundled components and recorded advisory matches
ComponentVersionAdvisory matches
androidx.compose.ui:ui1.10.6None recorded
com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp3.14.9
1 match

CVE-2021-0341 · medium
Improper hostname verification in certain configurations could allow certificate spoofing / pinning bypass.
Fixed version: 4.9.2

Export SBOM
About this app · store information

About this app

Useful. Social. Expressive.

Content ratingEveryone
Download size141.0 MB
Privacy policyPublished →

Screenshots

App screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshot

Scan history

Each row is an observed scan. Gaps between scans do not establish how long a finding existed.

Scanned (UTC)BuildScoreGrade
2026-09-30 03:35 UTC580.0.0.49.9185B
2026-09-23 02:31 UTC579.0.0.61.9179B
2026-09-15 17:09 UTC578.0.0.45.9279B
2026-09-07 07:13 UTC577.0.0.49.8979B

View changes between the last two scans →

Export & share

Exports describe the recorded assessment. Signed evidence proves origin and integrity, not completeness or safety.

Coverage & gap matrix · Verify signed evidence

Embed the latest grade

Embed this grade

The badge reads the latest recorded grade each time it is loaded, and links back to the full report so a reader can see the build it covers and what the scan could not see.

apk-scanner.com exposure grade
Markdown
[![apk-scanner.com exposure grade](https://apk-scanner.com/app/com.facebook.orca/badge.svg)](https://apk-scanner.com/app/com.facebook.orca)
HTML
<a href="https://apk-scanner.com/app/com.facebook.orca"><img src="https://apk-scanner.com/app/com.facebook.orca/badge.svg" alt="apk-scanner.com exposure grade" height="20"></a>

Grades can move when a new version is scanned or when a detector is corrected. If you would rather publish a grade that cannot change under you, link a signed Proof Capsule instead.

API users can request authenticated, scan-specific exports at /v1/scans/a4a87662-4558-4e3f-a9d5-4af21c678c79/findings.sarif (also coverage.json and proof.json).

Request a correction or removal · How to interpret a scan · Browse apps