PrinterShare Mobile Print
Mobile Dynamix · Build 12.25.1
Static checks identify review items, not a guarantee of safety.
Backend checks: 2 unauthenticated read checks against backends referenced in this build — 2 refused access. Each check describes one request at the recorded scan time and does not establish the backend's current state.
Overview
3 finding categories to review
PrinterShare Mobile Print (com.dynamixsoftware.printershare) scored grade B, 92 out of 100, in a static scan of version 12.25.1 on 2026-11-01. It has no high or critical findings, and 3 lower-severity finding categories across 3 occurrences. 6 tracking SDKs are present in the package, which describes what ships, not what runs or what it sends. This is static analysis of a single build: it does not observe the app running and does not establish that any data is exposed.
Start with these findings
mediumShort signing key (RSA 1024-bit)1 occurrence
Interpretation & review guidance
The signing key is shorter than the modern 2048-bit RSA minimum. Short keys are cryptographically weaker; a release should re-key to at least RSA-2048 (or an EC key).
Remediation: Android app signing explained (v1, v2, v3 & Janus) →
Reference: CWE-326 · MASVS-CRYPTO-1 — what the control asks for, and other apps with the same finding.
- Evidence
- 1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
- Verification
- Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowFirebase Storage bucket reference1 occurrence
Interpretation & review guidance
A Firebase Cloud Storage bucket reference (the default <project>.appspot.com). Storing user files here is normal — it's only an exposure if the Storage security rules allow public read/list, which live verification tests.
Remediation: Fix a publicly readable Firebase database →
Reference: CWE-200 · CWE-284 · MASVS-STORAGE-2 — what the control asks for, and other apps with the same finding.
- Evidence
- 1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
- Verification
- Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)1 occurrence
Interpretation & review guidance
Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.
Remediation: How to store secrets in a mobile app (without hardcoding) →
Reference: CWE-798 · MASVS-STORAGE-1 — what the control asks for, and other apps with the same finding.
- Evidence
- 1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
- Verification
- Static detection; current reachability is not established.
Build & components
0 components recorded. Certificate parsing does not validate APK signature integrity.
Inspect build evidence →Findings
3 categories · 3 occurrences. Severity totals describe categories. Expand a finding for interpretation and review guidance.
mediumShort signing key (RSA 1024-bit)1 occurrence
Interpretation & review guidance
The signing key is shorter than the modern 2048-bit RSA minimum. Short keys are cryptographically weaker; a release should re-key to at least RSA-2048 (or an EC key).
Remediation: Android app signing explained (v1, v2, v3 & Janus) →
Reference: CWE-326 · MASVS-CRYPTO-1 — what the control asks for, and other apps with the same finding.
- Evidence
- 1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
- Verification
- Static detection; current reachability is not established.
Evidence preview
- Evidence type
- Signing metadata
- Representative location
META-INF/signing:key- Recorded match
RSA-1024- Detector rule
signing- Recorded file locations
META-INF/signing:key
1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.
Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.
Preview evidence and Pro toolsSearch recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.
lowFirebase Storage bucket reference1 occurrence
Interpretation & review guidance
A Firebase Cloud Storage bucket reference (the default <project>.appspot.com). Storing user files here is normal — it's only an exposure if the Storage security rules allow public read/list, which live verification tests.
Remediation: Fix a publicly readable Firebase database →
Reference: CWE-200 · CWE-284 · MASVS-STORAGE-2 — what the control asks for, and other apps with the same finding.
- Evidence
- 1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
- Verification
- Static detection; current reachability is not established.
Evidence preview
- Evidence type
- Static string match
- Representative location
resources.arsc- Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.- Detector rule
firebase_storage_bucket- Recorded file locations
resources.arsc
1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.
Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.
Preview evidence and Pro toolsSearch recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.
lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)1 occurrence
Interpretation & review guidance
Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.
Remediation: How to store secrets in a mobile app (without hardcoding) →
Reference: CWE-798 · MASVS-STORAGE-1 — what the control asks for, and other apps with the same finding.
- Evidence
- 1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
- Verification
- Static detection; current reachability is not established.
Evidence preview
- Evidence type
- Static string match
- Representative location
resources.arsc- Recorded match
AIza•••••••• (21–40 chars, redacted)- Detector rule
google_api_key- Recorded file locations
resources.arsc
1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.
Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.
Preview evidence and Pro toolsSearch recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.
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Privacy signals
Capabilities and bundled software do not prove that data was collected or transmitted.
Contacts Phone state Calendar Accounts
Requested permission inventory (24)
Data collection & flow (privacy signal, not part of the grade)
- Precise location requested while 1 ad/attribution SDK(s) are present (Google AdMob) — location commonly feeds ad targeting.
- Persistent-identifier APIs referenced in code (Advertising ID (AAID), Android ID, Device ID / IMEI) with 4 analytics/ad SDK(s) present — the mechanism used for cross-app profiling.
- Calendar, Contacts, Personal info, Phone, Photos & files data requested with third-party analytics/ad SDKs present.
This maps what the app can access (permissions it requests, identifier APIs its code references) to the third parties bundled in it. It reflects capability and SDK presence — not proof that a specific value was transmitted.
Data Safety comparison not recorded.
Trackers & SDKs (6 detected · privacy signal, not part of the grade)
Build & components
Scanned build 12.25.1. Store metadata may describe a newer release.
b56dd0a7959fe57f00c23bfae7e0133c76911588d1a5c55b0d5b179d71ef4d92Signing certificate (who signed this build — factual, not part of the grade)
14:31:a6:a8:0c:29:0c:bc:0a:cd:3f:d6:c4:78:9e:c2:20:d9:49:f0:47:8d:26:03:e6:5a:75:6c:fa:77:43:f4The certificate fingerprint identifies the parsed signing certificate. Knowing this public fingerprint does not establish ownership or validate the APK signature.
Component inventory
No bundled components detected by this scan.
Export SBOMAbout this app · store information
About this app
Print documents and photos directly from your Android device to any printer!
Screenshots
Scan history
Each row is an observed scan. Gaps between scans do not establish how long a finding existed.
| Scanned (UTC) | Build | Score | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 19:49 UTC | 12.25.1 | 92 | B |
Export & share
Exports describe the recorded assessment. Signed evidence proves origin and integrity, not completeness or safety.
Coverage & gap matrix · Verify signed evidence
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