Disney+
Disney · Build 26.18.0+rc5-2026.10.05
Static checks identify review items, not a guarantee of safety.
Overview
4 finding categories to review
Disney+ (com.disney.disneyplus) scored grade A, 92 out of 100, in a static scan of version 26.18.0+rc5-2026.10.05 on 2026-10-12. It has no high or critical findings, and 4 lower-severity finding categories across 6 occurrences. 9 tracking SDKs are present in the package, which describes what ships, not what runs or what it sends. This is static analysis of a single build: it does not observe the app running and does not establish that any data is exposed.
Start with these findings
mediumExported content provider without permission1 occurrence
Interpretation & review guidance
An exported content provider declares no permission. Other apps on the device may reach it — verify it enforces access control internally; this flags the attack surface, not a confirmed leak.
- Evidence
- 1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
- Verification
- Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowFirebase Storage bucket reference2 occurrences
Interpretation & review guidance
A Firebase Cloud Storage bucket reference (the default <project>.appspot.com). Storing user files here is normal — it's only an exposure if the Storage security rules allow public read/list, which live verification tests.
- Evidence
- 2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
- Verification
- Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)2 occurrences
Interpretation & review guidance
Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.
- Evidence
- 2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
- Verification
- Static detection; current reachability is not established.
Build & components
1 components recorded. Certificate parsing does not validate APK signature integrity.
Inspect build evidence →Findings
4 categories · 6 occurrences. Severity totals describe categories. Expand a finding for interpretation and review guidance.
mediumExported content provider without permission1 occurrence
Interpretation & review guidance
An exported content provider declares no permission. Other apps on the device may reach it — verify it enforces access control internally; this flags the attack surface, not a confirmed leak.
- Evidence
- 1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
- Verification
- Static detection; current reachability is not established.
Evidence preview
- Evidence type
- Parsed app configuration
- Representative location
AndroidManifest.xml:partner.[value redacted]- Recorded match
[value redacted] (exported, no permission)- Detector rule
manifest- Recorded file locations
AndroidManifest.xml:partner.[value redacted]
1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.
Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.
Preview evidence and Pro toolsSearch recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.
lowFirebase Storage bucket reference2 occurrences
Interpretation & review guidance
A Firebase Cloud Storage bucket reference (the default <project>.appspot.com). Storing user files here is normal — it's only an exposure if the Storage security rules allow public read/list, which live verification tests.
- Evidence
- 2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
- Verification
- Static detection; current reachability is not established.
Evidence preview
- Evidence type
- Static string match
- Representative location
classes.dex- Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.- Detector rule
firebase_storage_bucket- Recorded file locations
classes.dex
2 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.
Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.
Preview evidence and Pro toolsSearch recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.
lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)2 occurrences
Interpretation & review guidance
Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.
- Evidence
- 2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
- Verification
- Static detection; current reachability is not established.
Evidence preview
- Evidence type
- Static string match
- Representative location
classes.dex- Recorded match
AIza•••••••• (21–40 chars, redacted)- Detector rule
google_api_key- Recorded file locations
classes.dex
2 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.
Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.
Preview evidence and Pro toolsSearch recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.
infoApplication data is backup-enabled1 occurrence
Interpretation & review guidance
The app allows Android backups (android:allowBackup="true"). App data can then be extracted via adb backup on many devices — a concern if the app stores tokens or personal/health/payment data locally. Common and low-severity, but worth disabling for sensitive apps.
- Evidence
- 1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
- Verification
- Static detection; current reachability is not established.
Evidence preview
- Evidence type
- Parsed app configuration
- Representative location
AndroidManifest.xml- Recorded match
android:allowBackup="true"- Detector rule
manifest- Recorded file locations
AndroidManifest.xml
1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.
Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.
Preview evidence and Pro toolsSearch recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.
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Privacy signals
Capabilities and bundled software do not prove that data was collected or transmitted.
Precise location Approx. location Microphone
Requested permission inventory (16)
Data collection & flow (privacy signal, not part of the grade)
- Precise location, Approximate location requested while 1 ad/attribution SDK(s) are present (Google AdMob) — location commonly feeds ad targeting.
- Persistent-identifier APIs referenced in code (Advertising ID (AAID), Android ID, Device ID / IMEI) with 7 analytics/ad SDK(s) present — the mechanism used for cross-app profiling.
- Microphone data requested with third-party analytics/ad SDKs present.
This maps what the app can access (permissions it requests, identifier APIs its code references) to the third parties bundled in it. It reflects capability and SDK presence — not proof that a specific value was transmitted.
Data Safety: declared vs observed (Play label vs our analysis)
We compare the developer's Google Play Data Safety declaration with what the binary can actually do (permissions it requests, identifier APIs and third-party SDKs it ships). A mismatch is a capability signal to confirm — a requested permission is not proof of collection.
Trackers & SDKs (9 detected · privacy signal, not part of the grade)
Build & components
Scanned build 26.18.0+rc5-2026.10.05. Store metadata may describe a newer release.
a9ce237cc83417df64a5ed4cf5be087b828cc609c05b276d6934ef2c98d6b96fSigning certificate (who signed this build — factual, not part of the grade)
b4:d2:51:e9:79:ea:97:4d:8f:07:0f:eb:5a:b6:9f:c4:c2:87:3f:4e:8a:dd:42:1f:f6:3a:d5:f2:78:9d:63:d4The certificate fingerprint identifies the parsed signing certificate. Knowing this public fingerprint does not establish ownership or validate the APK signature.
Component inventory
1 components. Advisory matching covers a curated set; no match is not proof that a component is vulnerability-free.
| Component | Version | Advisory matches |
|---|---|---|
com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp | 5.4.0 | None recorded |
About this app · store information
About this app
Stream and download your favorite movies, TV shows & Originals on Disney+
Screenshots
Scan history
Each row is an observed scan. Gaps between scans do not establish how long a finding existed.
| Scanned (UTC) | Build | Score | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-12 23:33 UTC | 26.18.0+rc5-2026.10.05 | 92 | A |
| 2026-10-05 23:29 UTC | 26.17.0+rc4-2026.09.24 | 92 | A |
| 2026-09-28 23:26 UTC | 26.16.0+rc2-2026.09.08 | 91 | A |
| 2026-09-21 09:37 UTC | 26.16.0+rc2-2026.09.08 | 91 | A |
| 2026-09-14 03:42 UTC | 26.16.0+rc2-2026.09.08 | 91 | A |
| 2026-09-06 23:51 UTC | 26.15.1+rc1-2026.08.29 | 96 | A |
Export & share
Exports describe the recorded assessment. Signed evidence proves origin and integrity, not completeness or safety.
Coverage & gap matrix · Verify signed evidence
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