IR Swim Club

Island Recreational · Build 1.0.42

com.bf.appa3ce6a

Rescanning re-reads this build; it does not re-check any backend referenced inside it.

Static analysis completeScanned 2026-11-09 19:28 UTC

Static checks identify review items, not a guarantee of safety.

Backend checks: 2 unauthenticated read checks against backends referenced in this build — 2 refused access. Each check describes one request at the recorded scan time and does not establish the backend's current state.

Overview

Analysis recorded

5 finding categories to review

IR Swim Club (com.bf.appa3ce6a) scored grade B, 91 out of 100, in a static scan of version 1.0.42 on 2026-11-09. It has no high or critical findings, and 5 lower-severity finding categories across 5 occurrences. 6 tracking SDKs are present in the package, which describes what ships, not what runs or what it sends. This is static analysis of a single build: it does not observe the app running and does not establish that any data is exposed.

Finding categories55 occurrences
High / critical0Category count
Tracking SDKs6Presence, not observed traffic
Assessment score91 / 100Grade B

Start with these findings

mediumCleartext (HTTP) traffic permitted1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The manifest permits cleartext (HTTP) traffic. Data sent over plain HTTP can be read or tampered with on the network; modern apps should require HTTPS.

Reference: CWE-319 · MASVS-NETWORK-1 — what the control asks for, and other apps with the same finding.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowFirebase Storage bucket reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Cloud Storage bucket reference (the default <project>.appspot.com). Storing user files here is normal — it's only an exposure if the Storage security rules allow public read/list, which live verification tests.

Reference: CWE-200 · CWE-284 · MASVS-STORAGE-2 — what the control asks for, and other apps with the same finding.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Reference: CWE-798 · MASVS-STORAGE-1 — what the control asks for, and other apps with the same finding.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
View all 5 categories

Is this your app?

The findings above are counts. The app's developer can see each one in context, be told when a new build changes the result, and re-check any backend that answers. Verify that you control islandrecreational.com (the site on this app's Play listing) to open that view. Free; no card.

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Privacy

37 requested permissions · 5 flagged high-risk classes.

Review privacy signals →

Build & components

0 components recorded. Certificate parsing does not validate APK signature integrity.

Inspect build evidence →

Findings

5 categories · 5 occurrences. Severity totals describe categories. Expand a finding for interpretation and review guidance.

mediumCleartext (HTTP) traffic permitted1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The manifest permits cleartext (HTTP) traffic. Data sent over plain HTTP can be read or tampered with on the network; modern apps should require HTTPS.

Reference: CWE-319 · MASVS-NETWORK-1 — what the control asks for, and other apps with the same finding.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Parsed app configuration
Representative location
AndroidManifest.xml
Recorded match
android:usesCleartextTraffic="true"
Detector rule
manifest
Recorded file locations
  • AndroidManifest.xml

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowFirebase Storage bucket reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Cloud Storage bucket reference (the default <project>.appspot.com). Storing user files here is normal — it's only an exposure if the Storage security rules allow public read/list, which live verification tests.

Reference: CWE-200 · CWE-284 · MASVS-STORAGE-2 — what the control asks for, and other apps with the same finding.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
firebase_storage_bucket
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Reference: CWE-798 · MASVS-STORAGE-1 — what the control asks for, and other apps with the same finding.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
AIza•••••••• (21–40 chars, redacted)
Detector rule
google_api_key
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

lowPrivate key material (third-party library artifact, shared across 74 unrelated developers)1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A complete PEM private-key block is embedded in the app. This is a real finding worth review — but it is often a bundled library test/sample key rather than a production secret, so we flag it high and leave confirmation to you (a bare header alone no longer triggers it).

Reference: CWE-321 · MASVS-CRYPTO-2 — what the control asks for, and other apps with the same finding.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
classes.dex
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
private_key
Recorded file locations
  • classes.dex

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

infoApplication data is backup-enabled1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app allows Android backups (android:allowBackup="true"). App data can then be extracted via adb backup on many devices — a concern if the app stores tokens or personal/health/payment data locally. Common and low-severity, but worth disabling for sensitive apps.

Reference: CWE-530 · CWE-312 · MASVS-STORAGE-1 · MASVS-STORAGE-2 — what the control asks for, and other apps with the same finding.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Parsed app configuration
Representative location
AndroidManifest.xml
Recorded match
android:allowBackup="true"
Detector rule
manifest
Recorded file locations
  • AndroidManifest.xml

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

Privacy signals

Capabilities and bundled software do not prove that data was collected or transmitted.

Requested permissions37
Flagged high-risk classes5
Detected SDKs6

Precise location Approx. location Camera Microphone Storage

Requested permission inventory (37)
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_AD_ID
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_ATTRIBUTION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_CUSTOM_AUDIENCE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_TOPICS
  • android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.CAMERA
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS
  • android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS
  • android.permission.READ_APP_BADGE
  • android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO
  • android.permission.VIBRATE
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
  • com.anddoes.launcher.permission.UPDATE_COUNT
  • com.bf.appa3ce6a.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION
  • com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE
  • com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.UPDATE_SHORTCUT
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.CHANGE_BADGE
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS
  • com.majeur.launcher.permission.UPDATE_BADGE
  • com.oppo.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.oppo.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.READ
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.WRITE
  • com.sonyericsson.home.permission.BROADCAST_BADGE
  • com.sonymobile.home.permission.PROVIDER_INSERT_BADGE
  • me.everything.badger.permission.BADGE_COUNT_READ
  • me.everything.badger.permission.BADGE_COUNT_WRITE

Data collection & flow (privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Data the app can access
Camera
Camera
Location
Approximate locationPrecise location
Microphone
Microphone
Photos & files
StorageStorage (write)
Persistent identifiers (referenced in code)
Advertising ID (AAID)Android IDDevice ID / IMEIHardware MAC address
Where it can go
Third parties present (5)
Google AdMobGoogle Analytics for FirebaseGoogle Firebase AnalyticsGoogle Tag ManagerMeta / Facebook SDK
  • Approximate location, Precise location requested while 1 ad/attribution SDK(s) are present (Google AdMob) — location commonly feeds ad targeting.
  • Persistent-identifier APIs referenced in code (Advertising ID (AAID), Android ID, Device ID / IMEI +1 more) with 5 analytics/ad SDK(s) present — the mechanism used for cross-app profiling.
  • Camera, Microphone, Photos & files data requested with third-party analytics/ad SDKs present.

This maps what the app can access (permissions it requests, identifier APIs its code references) to the third parties bundled in it. It reflects capability and SDK presence — not proof that a specific value was transmitted.

Data Safety comparison not recorded.

Trackers & SDKs (6 detected · privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Advertising
Google AdMob
Analytics
Google Analytics for FirebaseGoogle Firebase AnalyticsGoogle Tag ManagerMeta / Facebook SDK
Consent
IAB TCF

Build & components

Scanned build 1.0.42. Store metadata may describe a newer release.

APK SHA-256dbe0b90970e4431927ffa056cd830bcd9560750e1c6a35b86b5ae23628423dd0

Signing certificate (who signed this build — factual, not part of the grade)

Signer
kaleoapps self-signed
Scheme
V3V2V1
Key
RSA 2048-bit
Algorithm
sha1WithRSA
Validity
2014-03-07 → 2041-07-23
Cert SHA-256
2f:79:24:4f:dc:ae:40:57:71:58:70:5d:e6:f5:4f:70:ba:26:ef:38:df:f0:d9:3d:1a:a8:bd:29:b2:3f:1f:ab

The certificate fingerprint identifies the parsed signing certificate. Knowing this public fingerprint does not establish ownership or validate the APK signature.

Signature integrity: not established by certificate parsing.

Component inventory

No bundled components detected by this scan.

Export SBOM
About this app · store information

About this app

Island Recreational has been Long Island's neighborhood pool store since 1975

Content ratingEveryone
Download size10.3 MB
Privacy policyPublished →

Screenshots

App screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshot

Scan history

Each row is an observed scan. Gaps between scans do not establish how long a finding existed.

Scanned (UTC)BuildScoreGrade
2026-11-09 19:28 UTC1.0.4291B

View changes between the last two scans →

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Coverage & gap matrix · Verify signed evidence

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