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Ajax Security System

Ajax Systems Inc · Build 3.57

com.ajaxsystems
Static analysis completeScanned 2026-10-09 15:09 UTC

Static checks identify review items, not a guarantee of safety.

Overview

Analysis recorded

7 finding categories to review

Ajax Security System (com.ajaxsystems) scored grade A, 93 out of 100, in a static scan of version 3.57 on 2026-10-09. It has no high or critical findings, and 7 lower-severity finding categories across 17 occurrences. 7 tracking SDKs are present in the package, which describes what ships, not what runs or what it sends. This is static analysis of a single build: it does not observe the app running and does not establish that any data is exposed.

Finding categories717 occurrences
High / critical0Category count
Tracking SDKs7Presence, not observed traffic
Assessment score93 / 100Grade A

Start with these findings

lowAmazon S3 bucket reference3 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

A reference to an Amazon S3 bucket. Using cloud storage is normal — the risk exists only if the bucket allows anonymous listing/read, which requires a separate authorized assessment.

Evidence
3 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowBackground location access with advertising SDKs present1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app can access location in the background (even when closed) and also ships advertising/attribution SDKs. Background location is a heightened-scrutiny area for Google Play and privacy regulators; confirm it is essential and disclosed, and that location isn't shared with ad networks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowData Safety label omits Contacts1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app's Google Play Data Safety label omits a data category it can actually access — a permission it requests, or an advertising/device identifier it references. Under-declaring collection is a Play policy issue and a COPPA/privacy concern. This is a static signal: a requested permission is capability, not proof of collection — confirm against runtime behavior.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
View all 7 categories

Privacy

40 requested permissions · 6 flagged high-risk classes.

Review privacy signals →

Build & components

1 components recorded. Certificate parsing does not validate APK signature integrity.

Inspect build evidence →

Findings

7 categories · 17 occurrences. Severity totals describe categories. Expand a finding for interpretation and review guidance.

lowAmazon S3 bucket reference3 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

A reference to an Amazon S3 bucket. Using cloud storage is normal — the risk exists only if the bucket allows anonymous listing/read, which requires a separate authorized assessment.

Evidence
3 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
classes35.dex
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
s3_bucket_url
Recorded file locations
  • classes35.dex

3 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowBackground location access with advertising SDKs present1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app can access location in the background (even when closed) and also ships advertising/attribution SDKs. Background location is a heightened-scrutiny area for Google Play and privacy regulators; confirm it is essential and disclosed, and that location isn't shared with ad networks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static privacy indicators
Representative location
pii:bgloc
Recorded match
background location + ad SDKs
Detector rule
pii
Recorded file locations
  • pii:bgloc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

lowData Safety label omits Contacts1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

The app's Google Play Data Safety label omits a data category it can actually access — a permission it requests, or an advertising/device identifier it references. Under-declaring collection is a Play policy issue and a COPPA/privacy concern. This is a static signal: a requested permission is capability, not proof of collection — confirm against runtime behavior.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
data-safety:Contacts
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

lowFirebase Realtime Database reference1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Realtime Database URL. Nearly every app that uses Firebase ships one. It's only an exposure if the database rules are world-readable — that's what live verification checks.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
firebase_db
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

lowFirebase Storage bucket reference3 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Cloud Storage bucket reference (the default <project>.appspot.com). Storing user files here is normal — it's only an exposure if the Storage security rules allow public read/list, which live verification tests.

Evidence
3 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
firebase_storage_bucket
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

3 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)3 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
3 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
AIza•••••••• (21–40 chars, redacted)
Detector rule
google_api_key
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

3 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

lowPrivate key material (third-party library artifact, shared across 63 unrelated developers)5 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

A complete PEM private-key block is embedded in the app. This is a real finding worth review — but it is often a bundled library test/sample key rather than a production secret, so we flag it high and leave confirmation to you (a bare header alone no longer triggers it).

Evidence
5 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
classes23.dex
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
private_key
Recorded file locations
  • classes23.dex

5 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

Privacy signals

Capabilities and bundled software do not prove that data was collected or transmitted.

Requested permissions40
Flagged high-risk classes6
Detected SDKs7

Background location Precise location Approx. location Camera Microphone Contacts

Requested permission inventory (40)
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_AD_ID
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_ATTRIBUTION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECT
  • android.permission.BLUETOOTH_SCAN
  • android.permission.CAMERA
  • android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.FLASHLIGHT
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_CONNECTED_DEVICE
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS
  • android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS
  • android.permission.READ_CONTACTS
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
  • android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO
  • android.permission.USE_BIOMETRIC
  • android.permission.USE_FINGERPRINT
  • android.permission.USE_FULL_SCREEN_INTENT
  • android.permission.VIBRATE
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • com.ajaxsystems.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION
  • com.ajaxsystems.permission.MAPS_RECEIVE
  • com.anddoes.launcher.permission.UPDATE_COUNT
  • com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE
  • com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID
  • com.google.android.providers.gsf.permission.READ_GSERVICES
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.UPDATE_SHORTCUT
  • com.majeur.launcher.permission.UPDATE_BADGE
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.READ
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.WRITE
  • com.sonyericsson.home.permission.BROADCAST_BADGE

Data collection & flow (privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Data the app can access
Camera
Camera
Contacts
Contacts
Location
Background locationApproximate locationPrecise location
Microphone
Microphone
Photos & files
Storage (write)Storage
Persistent identifiers (referenced in code)
Advertising ID (AAID)Android IDDevice ID / IMEIHardware MAC address
Where it can go
Third parties present (5)
Google AdMobGoogle Analytics for FirebaseGoogle Firebase AnalyticsGoogle Tag ManagerNew Relic
  • Background location, Approximate location, Precise location requested while 1 ad/attribution SDK(s) are present (Google AdMob) — location commonly feeds ad targeting.
  • Persistent-identifier APIs referenced in code (Advertising ID (AAID), Android ID, Device ID / IMEI +1 more) with 5 analytics/ad SDK(s) present — the mechanism used for cross-app profiling.
  • Camera, Contacts, Microphone, Photos & files data requested with third-party analytics/ad SDKs present.

This maps what the app can access (permissions it requests, identifier APIs its code references) to the third parties bundled in it. It reflects capability and SDK presence — not proof that a specific value was transmitted.

Data Safety: declared vs observed (Play label vs our analysis)

Declared collected
App activityApp info and performanceDevice or other IDsLocationMessagesPersonal info
Declared shared
Location
We observe the app can access
ContactsLocation
⚠ Possible Data Safety mismatch. Label omits 1 category the app can access: Contacts.

We compare the developer's Google Play Data Safety declaration with what the binary can actually do (permissions it requests, identifier APIs and third-party SDKs it ships). A mismatch is a capability signal to confirm — a requested permission is not proof of collection.

Trackers & SDKs (7 detected · privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Advertising
Google AdMob
Analytics
Google Analytics for FirebaseGoogle Firebase AnalyticsGoogle Tag ManagerNew Relic
Consent
IAB TCF
Crash reporting
Google Crashlytics

Build & components

Scanned build 3.57. Store metadata may describe a newer release.

APK SHA-2567fefb31e513e2fff376ef70dff8b13945c0f561232c71e48d838c8435a68ba52

Signing certificate (who signed this build — factual, not part of the grade)

Signer
Ajax Systems self-signed
Scheme
V3V2
Key
RSA 2048-bit
Algorithm
sha256WithRSA
Validity
2015-10-14 → 2045-10-06
Cert SHA-256
6d:37:b1:ab:d4:dc:91:2a:a7:83:fe:55:73:a0:de:e8:20:dd:79:57:d0:9c:c4:b3:1f:c1:d2:bc:54:dd:ee:5a

The certificate fingerprint identifies the parsed signing certificate. Knowing this public fingerprint does not establish ownership or validate the APK signature.

Signature integrity: not established by certificate parsing.

Component inventory

1 components. Advisory matching covers a curated set; no match is not proof that a component is vulnerability-free.

Bundled components and recorded advisory matches
ComponentVersionAdvisory matches
com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp4.12.0None recorded
Export SBOM
About this app · store information

About this app

Rule your space

Content ratingEveryone
Download size541.9 MB
Privacy policyPublished →
Developer sitewww.ajax.systems

Screenshots

App screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshot

Scan history

Each row is an observed scan. Gaps between scans do not establish how long a finding existed.

Scanned (UTC)BuildScoreGrade
2026-10-09 15:09 UTC3.5793A
2026-10-02 13:23 UTC3.5693A
2026-09-07 09:29 UTC3.5493A

View changes between the last two scans →

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Exports describe the recorded assessment. Signed evidence proves origin and integrity, not completeness or safety.

Coverage & gap matrix · Verify signed evidence

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apk-scanner.com exposure grade
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