Browse appsScan report

PolyBuzz: Chat with AI Friends

CLOUD WHALE INTERACTIVE TECHNOLOGY LLC. · Build 2.2.82

ai.socialapps.speakmaster
Limited coverageScanned 2026-10-10 12:29 UTC

Review the recorded findings below. An overall grade is withheld where required checks lack coverage; a new scan may provide additional evidence.

Analysis limitations (1)
  • The amount of extracted text exceeded the analysis limit.

Overview

Limited assessment

3 finding categories to review

PolyBuzz: Chat with AI Friends (ai.socialapps.speakmaster) was scanned at version 2.2.82 on 2026-10-10 but is not graded, because the analysis did not complete enough of its checks for a score to mean anything. The checks that did run recorded 3 finding categories across 6 occurrences; because the analysis did not complete, the absence of anything more severe is not a result. 23 tracking SDKs are present in the package, which describes what ships, not what runs or what it sends. This is static analysis of a single build: it does not observe the app running and does not establish that any data is exposed.

Finding categories36 occurrences
High / critical0Category count
Tracking SDKs23Presence, not observed traffic
Assessment scoreNot gradedNot graded

Start with these findings

lowExported content provider without permission (third-party library artifact, shared across 403 unrelated developers)2 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

An exported content provider declares no permission. Other apps on the device may reach it — verify it enforces access control internally; this flags the attack surface, not a confirmed leak.

Evidence
2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowFirebase Storage bucket reference3 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Cloud Storage bucket reference (the default <project>.appspot.com). Storing user files here is normal — it's only an exposure if the Storage security rules allow public read/list, which live verification tests.

Evidence
3 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.
View all 3 categories

Privacy

58 requested permissions · 6 flagged high-risk classes.

Review privacy signals →

Build & components

1 components recorded. Certificate parsing does not validate APK signature integrity.

Inspect build evidence →

Findings

3 categories · 6 occurrences. Severity totals describe categories. Expand a finding for interpretation and review guidance.

lowExported content provider without permission (third-party library artifact, shared across 403 unrelated developers)2 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

An exported content provider declares no permission. Other apps on the device may reach it — verify it enforces access control internally; this flags the attack surface, not a confirmed leak.

Evidence
2 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Parsed app configuration
Representative location
AndroidManifest.xml:com.facebook.FacebookContentProvider
Recorded match
FacebookContentProvider (exported, no permission)
Detector rule
manifest
Recorded file locations
  • AndroidManifest.xml:com.facebook.FacebookContentProvider

2 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

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lowFirebase Storage bucket reference3 occurrences

Interpretation & review guidance

A Firebase Cloud Storage bucket reference (the default <project>.appspot.com). Storing user files here is normal — it's only an exposure if the Storage security rules allow public read/list, which live verification tests.

Evidence
3 recorded occurrences in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
Pattern recorded; identifying value redacted.
Detector rule
firebase_storage_bucket
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

3 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

lowGoogle API key (client-shipped; restriction unverified)1 occurrence

Interpretation & review guidance

Android apps are designed to ship Google API keys in the client; Google restricts them by app signing certificate + enabled API. This is only a problem if the key is left unrestricted — presence alone is expected, not an exposure.

Evidence
1 recorded occurrence in the analyzed APK. These are distinct stored findings, not a count of every source match.
Verification
Static detection; current reachability is not established.

Evidence preview

Evidence type
Static string match
Representative location
resources.arsc
Recorded match
AIza•••••••• (21–40 chars, redacted)
Detector rule
google_api_key
Recorded file locations
  • resources.arsc

1 recorded findings have inspectable metadata. Duplicate matches may share a representative location.

Review whether this belongs to intended app functionality or a bundled library. A static match does not establish runtime impact.

Preview evidence and Pro tools

Search recorded evidence and save private review notes with Pro. $99/month plus applicable tax.

Privacy signals

Capabilities and bundled software do not prove that data was collected or transmitted.

Requested permissions58
Flagged high-risk classes6
Detected SDKs23

Precise location Approx. location Camera Microphone Phone state Draw over other apps

Requested permission inventory (58)
  • ai.socialapps.speakmaster.DYNAMIC_RECEIVER_NOT_EXPORTED_PERMISSION
  • ai.socialapps.speakmaster.permission.DEBUG
  • ai.socialapps.speakmaster.permission.TDOS_DIAGNOSE_BROADCAST
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_AD_ID
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_ATTRIBUTION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_CUSTOM_AUDIENCE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_ADSERVICES_TOPICS
  • android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.ACCESS_NOTIFICATION_POLICY
  • android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.BROADCAST_CLOSE_SYSTEM_DIALOGS
  • android.permission.BROADCAST_STICKY
  • android.permission.CAMERA
  • android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE
  • android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE
  • android.permission.FLASHLIGHT
  • android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE
  • android.permission.INSTALL_GRANT_RUNTIME_PERMISSIONS
  • android.permission.INTERNET
  • android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS
  • android.permission.PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS
  • android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS
  • android.permission.READ_APP_BADGE
  • android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE
  • android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
  • android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO
  • android.permission.SCHEDULE_EXACT_ALARM
  • android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
  • android.permission.USE_CREDENTIALS
  • android.permission.VIBRATE
  • android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
  • android.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS
  • com.amazon.privacypass.ATTEST
  • com.anddoes.launcher.permission.UPDATE_COUNT
  • com.android.vending.BILLING
  • com.android.vending.CHECK_LICENSE
  • com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE
  • com.google.android.finsky.permission.BIND_GET_INSTALL_REFERRER_SERVICE
  • com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID
  • com.google.android.providers.gsf.permission.READ_GSERVICES
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.htc.launcher.permission.UPDATE_SHORTCUT
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.CHANGE_BADGE
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS
  • com.huawei.appmarket.service.commondata.permission.GET_COMMON_DATA
  • com.majeur.launcher.permission.UPDATE_BADGE
  • com.oppo.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS
  • com.oppo.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS
  • com.samsung.android.mapsagent.permission.READ_APP_INFO
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.READ
  • com.sec.android.provider.badge.permission.WRITE
  • com.sonyericsson.home.permission.BROADCAST_BADGE
  • com.sonymobile.home.permission.PROVIDER_INSERT_BADGE
  • me.everything.badger.permission.BADGE_COUNT_READ
  • me.everything.badger.permission.BADGE_COUNT_WRITE

Data collection & flow (privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Data the app can access
Camera
Camera
Location
Precise locationApproximate location
Microphone
Microphone
Phone
Phone state / number
Photos & files
StorageStorage (write)
Persistent identifiers (referenced in code)
Advertising ID (AAID)Android IDDevice ID / IMEISubscriber ID (IMSI)SIM serialHardware MAC address
Where it can go
Third parties present (20)
AppLovinChartboostGoogle AdMobInMobiMeta Audience NetworkMintegralPangle (ByteDance)TapjoyUnity AdsVungleYandex AdsironSourceBraze (Appboy)Google Analytics for FirebaseGoogle Firebase AnalyticsGoogle Tag ManagerMeta / Facebook SDKYandex MetricaAdjustAppsFlyer
  • Precise location, Approximate location requested while 14 ad/attribution SDK(s) are present (AppLovin, Chartboost, Google AdMob +11 more) — location commonly feeds ad targeting.
  • Persistent-identifier APIs referenced in code (Advertising ID (AAID), Android ID, Device ID / IMEI +3 more) with 20 analytics/ad SDK(s) present — the mechanism used for cross-app profiling.
  • Camera, Microphone, Phone, Photos & files data requested with third-party analytics/ad SDKs present.

This maps what the app can access (permissions it requests, identifier APIs its code references) to the third parties bundled in it. It reflects capability and SDK presence — not proof that a specific value was transmitted.

Data Safety comparison is not conclusive because analysis coverage is incomplete or unknown.

Trackers & SDKs (23 detected · privacy signal, not part of the grade)

Advertising
AppLovinChartboostGoogle AdMobInMobiMeta Audience NetworkMintegralPangle (ByteDance)TapjoyUnity AdsVungleYandex AdsironSource
Analytics
Braze (Appboy)Google Analytics for FirebaseGoogle Firebase AnalyticsGoogle Tag ManagerMeta / Facebook SDKYandex Metrica
Attribution
AdjustAppsFlyer
Consent
Google UMP (consent)IAB TCF
Crash reporting
Google Crashlytics

Build & components

Scanned build 2.2.82. Store metadata may describe a newer release.

APK SHA-256940467f24bd637e49abe87dec5b733e21933b3f8c4ea12240114137333cb11f1

Signing certificate (who signed this build — factual, not part of the grade)

Signer
hire self-signed
Scheme
V3V2
Key
RSA 2048-bit
Algorithm
sha256WithRSA
Validity
2022-12-27 → 2222-11-09
Cert SHA-256
93:66:33:60:4c:98:18:51:80:49:69:b7:61:18:95:ec:0e:3c:9d:a5:f1:2a:bd:df:45:db:77:06:0c:6f:f5:e1

The certificate fingerprint identifies the parsed signing certificate. Knowing this public fingerprint does not establish ownership or validate the APK signature.

Signature integrity: not established by certificate parsing.

Component inventory

1 components. Advisory matching covers a curated set; no match is not proof that a component is vulnerability-free.

Bundled components and recorded advisory matches
ComponentVersionAdvisory matches
com.squareup.okhttp3:okhttp4.12.0None recorded
Export SBOM
About this app · store information

About this app

Talk & engage with anime characters and start a rizz story anytime, anywhere

Content ratingMature 17+
Download size196.1 MB
Privacy policyPublished →
Developer siteapp.polybuzz.ai

Screenshots

App screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshotApp screenshot

Scan history

Each row is an observed scan. Gaps between scans do not establish how long a finding existed.

Scanned (UTC)BuildScoreGrade
2026-10-10 12:29 UTC2.2.82Not gradedNot graded
2026-10-03 09:28 UTC2.2.82Not gradedNot graded
2026-09-26 09:20 UTC2.2.82Not gradedNot graded
2026-09-17 20:48 UTC2.2.72Not gradedNot graded
2026-09-08 10:58 UTC2.2.7297A

View changes between the last two scans →

Export & share

Exports describe the recorded assessment. Signed evidence proves origin and integrity, not completeness or safety.

Coverage & gap matrix · Verify signed evidence

API users can request authenticated, scan-specific exports at /v1/scans/6a646636-1f27-4d43-88c8-15b9061dea83/findings.sarif (also coverage.json and proof.json).

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